How the Rise and Fall of Regimes Affects Judicial Review

J. Balkin
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Abstract

The rise and fall of regimes shapes partisan attitudes about judicial review. How people feel about judicial activism and judicial restraint depends on where they are in political time, and which party tends to control the federal courts. The parties’ positions are mirror images. Over the course of a regime the dominant party increasingly relies on judicial review to achieve its goals, while the opposition party becomes increasingly skeptical of judicial review and advocates judicial restraint—although neither party ever fully abandons using judicial review to advance its policies. As the cycle moves from the beginning of a regime to its final days, the parties—and the legal intellectuals allied with them—gradually switch positions. The party of judicial restraint becomes the party of judicial engagement, and vice-versa. The effect, however, is generational; older people may stick with their hard-won lessons about the courts, while younger generations, who have very different experiences, take contrary positions.
政权的兴衰如何影响司法审查
政权的兴衰塑造了党派对司法审查的态度。人们对司法能动主义和司法克制的看法取决于他们所处的政治时期,以及哪个政党倾向于控制联邦法院。两党立场截然相反。在一个政权的发展过程中,执政党越来越依赖司法审查来实现其目标,而反对党则越来越怀疑司法审查并主张司法约束——尽管两党都没有完全放弃利用司法审查来推进其政策。从一个政权的开始到最后的日子,政党——以及与他们结盟的法律知识分子——逐渐改变立场。司法约束的一方成为司法参与的一方,反之亦然。然而,这种影响是世代相传的;老一辈人可能会坚持他们来之不易的关于法院的经验教训,而拥有截然不同经验的年轻一代则持相反的立场。
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