Relational Selves: Gender and Cultural Differences in Moral Reasoning

H. Edge, M. Mclaren
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The analysis of moral reasoning requires an interdisciplinary approach. Because it is central to moral theory and ethics, it is a basic concern of philosophers; but because it deals with cognition, reasoning, and moral development (and thus, more generally, human development), it is also an important area in psychology. Our paper addresses both of these disciplines as well as the intersection of gender and culture by exploring the ways that empirical research can help to illuminate philosophical issues about moral reasoning and its relationship to conceptions of self. In a recent lead article for Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan argued that most research in psychology has been carried out on WEIRD subjects; Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic. (1) They assert that enough data exists to call into question generalizing those findings to the status of universal psychological knowledge. Saying that Americans are "the most individualistic people in the world," they point out that Western cultures differ in cognition from non-Western ones. (2) Westerners prefer analytic thought while non-Westerners prefer holistic reasoning, and these differences give rise to different cognitive strategies employed in moral reasoning. In particular, Richard Nisbett also argues for this distinction, bringing empirical evidence to show that the two cultures have different approaches to reasoning, and these match their independent and interdependent views of themselves. (3) In addition to these cultural studies, much research has been carried out on gender differences in moral reasoning, and increasingly research has also examined cultural differences specifically in moral thinking. In this paper we explore both the parallels and the intersections between gender and cultural differences in moral thinking. We bring together work from philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and women's and gender studies to analyze our recent empirical data that demonstrate both gender and cultural differences in moral reasoning, as well as their intersection. We support the following claims about culture, moral reasoning, and concepts of self: 1) Concepts of self are tied to approaches to moral reasoning. 2) Concepts of self differ by gender and culture. 3) Moral reasoning differs by gender and culture. 4) Gender and culture intersect in the formation of self-identity. We demonstrate the above four points both through our empirical research and a discussion of the growing body of literature in support of these claims in the aforementioned disciplines. Furthermore, we believe that theoretical claims ought to be informed, at least in part, by empirical data when the claims relate to aspects of human development, such as moral reasoning. Both theory and empirical research lends support to the view that Western males are unique in their moral reasoning, overemphasizing independence and isolation over interdependence and connectedness. We find this in our data as American males consistently ranked lower on scales of interdependence and connectedness than American females, Balinese females and, interestingly, Balinese males. Given that American males are the anomaly, it seems clear that theories of moral development should neither begin from nor be limited to American males. We propose that philosophy, particularly moral philosophy, follow the lead of psychology and strive to be as inclusive as possible by including the full range of human diversity and experience. For philosophers, this would mean embracing--indeed, starting from--a multicultural, feminist approach to moral theories and questions; this approach would not only be sensitive to gender and cultural bias, but it also offers an alternative model to the paradigmatic rational, autonomous, independent agent of traditional moral theory. I. Conceptions of Self and Moral Reasoning Feminists have long questioned the standard view of moral reasoning and the concomitant conception of the self. …
关系自我:道德推理中的性别和文化差异
道德推理的分析需要跨学科的方法。因为它是道德理论和伦理学的核心,它是哲学家们的一个基本关注点;但由于它涉及认知、推理和道德发展(因此,更广泛地说,涉及人类发展),它也是心理学的一个重要领域。我们的论文通过探索实证研究有助于阐明有关道德推理及其与自我概念的关系的哲学问题的方式,解决了这两个学科以及性别和文化的交集。在《行为与脑科学》杂志最近的一篇主要文章中,Henrich、Heine和Norenzayan认为,大多数心理学研究都是在WEIRD主题上进行的;西方的,受过教育的,工业化的,富有的,民主的。他们断言,已有足够的数据对将这些发现概括为普遍心理学知识的地位提出了质疑。他们说美国人是“世界上最个人主义的人”,并指出西方文化与非西方文化在认知上存在差异。(2)西方人更倾向于分析思维,而非西方人更倾向于整体推理,这些差异导致了在道德推理中使用不同的认知策略。理查德·尼斯贝特(Richard Nisbett)特别提出了这种区别,他以经验证据表明,这两种文化有不同的推理方法,而这些方法与它们各自独立和相互依存的观点相匹配。(3)除了这些文化研究之外,对道德推理中的性别差异进行了大量研究,并且越来越多的研究还专门研究了道德思维中的文化差异。在本文中,我们探讨了道德思维中性别和文化差异之间的相似之处和交集。我们汇集了哲学、心理学、人类学、社会学和妇女与性别研究的成果,分析了我们最近的经验数据,这些数据显示了道德推理中的性别和文化差异,以及它们的交集。我们支持以下关于文化、道德推理和自我概念的主张:1)自我概念与道德推理的方法有关。2)自我概念因性别和文化的不同而不同。3)道德推理因性别和文化而异。4)性别与文化在自我认同的形成过程中相互交织。我们通过我们的实证研究和对支持上述学科中这些主张的越来越多的文献的讨论来证明上述四点。此外,我们认为,当理论主张与人类发展的各个方面(如道德推理)有关时,至少在一定程度上,理论主张应该得到经验数据的支持。理论和实证研究都支持这样一种观点,即西方男性在道德推理方面是独一无二的,他们过分强调独立和孤立,而不是相互依存和联系。我们在数据中发现,在相互依赖和联系方面,美国男性的排名一直低于美国女性、巴厘岛女性,有趣的是,也低于巴厘岛男性。鉴于美国男性是特例,很明显,道德发展理论既不应该从美国男性开始,也不应该局限于美国男性。我们建议哲学,特别是道德哲学,遵循心理学的领导,努力通过包括人类多样性和经验的全方位来尽可能地包容。对于哲学家来说,这意味着拥抱——实际上是从——一种多元文化的、女权主义的道德理论和问题的方法开始的;这种方法不仅对性别和文化偏见敏感,而且还为传统道德理论的范式理性、自主、独立主体提供了另一种模型。长期以来,女权主义者一直质疑道德推理的标准观点和伴随而来的自我概念。…
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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