Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model of Bidding Behavior for Electricity Purchase and Sale in Power Market

Dingmei Wang, Ruixiao Zhang, Long Zhao
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Abstract

There are a lot of random interference factors in the power market, which seriously affect the bidding behavior between power generation and power purchasing enterprises. So, in this paper the Gaussian white noise is introduced into the replication dynamic equation to reflect the random interference in the multi-agent bidding process of electricity purchase and sale in the power market, and a random dynamic system is established. The stochastic evolutionary game model of three heterogeneous groups under asymmetric information is constructed, and the model is solved by using stochastic differential equation theory. From the three aspects of enterprise quotation strategy, enterprise income and incentive measures, this paper analyzes the conditions for the gradual stability of bidding behavior in the process of random evolutionary game between power purchasing and power selling groups. The stability of bidding behavior in the process of stochastic evolutionary game between power purchasing and selling groups is analyzed. Finally, taking the bidding behavior of three heterogeneous groups as an example, the dynamic evolution simulation of bidding behavior in power market is carried out. The results show that the established model can more accurately reflect the evolution process of the bidding behavior of each group under the interference of random factors, and is closer to the dynamic change process of the bidding behavior of each power sale and purchase in the actual environment.
电力市场购售电竞价行为的随机演化博弈模型
电力市场中存在大量随机干扰因素,严重影响发电企业与购电企业之间的竞价行为。为此,本文在复制动态方程中引入高斯白噪声来反映电力市场中购售电多主体竞价过程中的随机干扰,建立了一个随机动态系统。建立了信息不对称条件下三种异质群体的随机进化博弈模型,并利用随机微分方程理论对模型进行了求解。本文从企业报价策略、企业收益和激励措施三个方面,分析了购电集团和售电集团在随机演化博弈过程中,竞价行为逐渐稳定的条件。分析了购电集团和售电集团在随机演化博弈过程中竞价行为的稳定性。最后,以三个异质群体的竞价行为为例,对电力市场竞价行为进行了动态演化仿真。结果表明,所建立的模型能更准确地反映随机因素干扰下各组竞价行为的演化过程,更接近实际环境下各售电和购电竞价行为的动态变化过程。
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