On the Importance of CEO Effort on Firm Performance and Compensation: An Analysis Using Gaussian Copula Marginal Regression Approach

John Villavicencio Mattos, J. Torrez
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Abstract

CEO effort is a vital determinant of a company’s profitability and for shareholder wealth. While effort is not an observable construct, its effects and results are palpable and it is defined as the final point to which the management directs its work. For an agent to perform at optimal levels, a principal grants various incentives with the objective of aligning their interests with that of the CEO but several studies have proven that this method does not completely alleviate agency problems. CEOs can take advantage of their managerial discretion and prioritize their personal interests. In this paper, we analyze the impact of CEO efforts on compensation and performance of mining companies. Our results indicate that in periods of economic growth, the companies enjoy marginal returns that do not seem to be the direct result of CEO effort. Also, we have found the CEO’s provide sub-optimal levels of effort during periods of economic growth but receive compensation that is approximately 6 percent greater than that received during recessionary periods.
CEO努力对企业绩效和薪酬的重要性:基于高斯联结边际回归方法的分析
CEO的努力是公司盈利能力和股东财富的重要决定因素。虽然努力不是一个可观察的结构,但它的效果和结果是显而易见的,并且它被定义为管理层指导其工作的最终点。为了使代理人在最佳水平上执行,委托人授予各种激励,目的是使他们的利益与首席执行官的利益保持一致,但一些研究证明,这种方法并不能完全缓解代理问题。首席执行官可以利用他们的管理自由裁量权,优先考虑他们的个人利益。本文分析了矿业公司CEO努力对薪酬和绩效的影响。我们的研究结果表明,在经济增长时期,公司享有的边际收益似乎不是CEO努力的直接结果。此外,我们还发现,在经济增长时期,首席执行官的努力程度并非最优,但他们的薪酬却比经济衰退时期高出约6%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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