Knowledge, Action, and Defeasibility

Abstract

This essay reviews some motivations for a ‘knowledge-centered psychology’—a psychology where knowledge enters center stage in an explanation of intentional action (Section 8.2). Then it outlines a novel argument for the claim that knowledge is required for intentional action (Section 8.3) and discusses some of its consequences, in particular for the debate on the defeasibility of know-how. Section 8.4 argues that a knowledge-centered psychology motivates the intellectualist view that know-how is a species of know-that. In its more extreme form, the view is committed to an epistemologically substantial claim—i.e., that the epistemic profile of know-how is the same as that of propositional knowledge. Now, it is widely believed that know-that can be defeated by undermining and rebutting defeaters (e.g., Chisholm 1966; Goldman 1986; Pollock and Cruz 1999; Bergmann 2000). If that is correct, one corollary of intellectualism is that the defeasibility of know-how patterns with that of knowledge. A knowledge-centered psychology does predict that, for it predicts that both know-how and knowledge are defeated when one’s ability to intentionally act is defeated. In Section 8.5, by replying to a challenge raised in the recent literature (Carter and Navarro 2018), I argue that this prediction is actually borne out.