Do Prime Brokers Matter in the Search for Informed Hedge Fund Managers?

G. Aragon, Ji-Woong Chung, Byoung Uk Kang
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Using the setting of funds of hedge funds (FoFs), we show that prime brokers (PBs) facilitate investors’ search for informed hedge fund managers. We find that FoFs exhibit PB bias, a disproportionate preference for hedge funds serviced by their connected PBs. This PB bias is stronger when the cost of hedge fund due diligence is higher relative to capital and when the FoF’s management firm generates higher prime brokerage fees. PB bias also predicts FoF performance: the highest PB-bias quartile outperforms the rest by 2.08%–2.45% per annum after adjusting for differences in their risks. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance.
机构经纪人在寻找知情的对冲基金经理中重要吗?
利用对冲基金的基金(FoFs)的设置,我们证明了机构经纪人(PBs)有助于投资者寻找知情的对冲基金经理。我们发现fof表现出PB偏好,即对由其关联的PB服务的对冲基金的不成比例的偏好。当对冲基金尽职调查的成本相对于资本较高,以及FoF的管理公司产生较高的大宗经纪费用时,这种PB偏好会更强。PB偏差也能预测FoF的表现:在调整风险差异后,PB偏差最高的四分位数每年的表现比其他四分位数高出2.08%-2.45%。这篇论文被财经的Victoria Ivashina接受。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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