Will the Paris Accord Accelerate Climate Change? (Ускоряет ли Парижское соглашение изменение климата?)

Laurence J. Kotlikoff, A. Polbin, A. Zubarev
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

The 2015 Paris Accord is meant to control our planet’s rising temperature. But it may be doing the opposite in gradually, rather than immediately reducing CO2 emissions. The Accord effectively tells dirty-energy producers to "use it or lose it." This may be accelerating their extraction and burning of fossil fuels and, thereby, be permanently raising temperatures. Our paper uses a simple OLG model to illustrate this long-noted Green Paradox. Its framework treats climate damage as a negative externality imposed by today’s generations on tomorrow’s – an externality that is, in part, irreversible and can tip the climate to permanently higher temperatures. In our model, delaying abatement can lead to larger changes in climate than doing nothing, reducing welfare for all generations. In contrast, immediate policy action can raise welfare for all generations. Finally we question the standard use of infinitely-lived, single-agent models, which assume, unrealistically, intergenerational altruism in determining optimal abatement policy. Their prescriptions can differ, potentially dramatically, from those needed to correct the negative climate externality today’s generations are imposing on tomorrow’s.
2015年的《巴黎协定》旨在控制地球不断上升的气温。但它可能正在逐渐减少二氧化碳排放,而不是立即减少二氧化碳排放。该协议实际上告诉污染能源生产商“要么利用它,要么失去它”。这可能会加速化石燃料的开采和燃烧,从而永久性地升高气温。我们的论文使用一个简单的OLG模型来说明这个久负盛名的绿色悖论。它的框架将气候破坏视为当代人对后代施加的负面外部性——这种外部性在一定程度上是不可逆转的,并可能使气候永久升高。在我们的模型中,推迟减排比什么都不做会导致更大的气候变化,减少所有世代的福利。相反,立即采取政策行动可以提高所有世代的福利。最后,我们对无限寿命单主体模型的标准使用提出质疑,该模型不切实际地假设在确定最佳减排政策时存在代际利他主义。他们开出的药方可能与纠正当前几代人对未来几代人施加的负面气候外部性所需的药方有很大不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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