Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action

Abstract

Although distinctions can be drawn between relations of simulation, replication, and emulation, basic differences between digital machines and human beings render the strong forms of anticipation that are impossible in principle. Because the use of signs in affecting behavior is dependent on a context of preexisting motives, beliefs, ethics, abilities and capabilities, ontic and epistemic difficulties relative to the complex interaction of distinct variables and relevant conditions to which each person has been subjected in his or her unique life, makes non-trivial explanations and predictions—ones not involving stereotyped or scripted behavior—theoretically impossible, including for the weakest forms of simulation. Indeed, even stereotypical behavior may not be predicable on similar grounds for real, historical human beings, not only in general but even for each single case. This study may even be viewed as an essay about freedom of the will.