Accountability, Corruption and Local Government: Mapping the Control Steps

Ana Luiza Aranha
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引用次数: 26

Abstract

When we think about improving the democratic control of corruption, the focus often falls upon changes in the accountability institutions. The recent literature indicates that, at the current stage of reform and democratization around the globe, accountability institutions must undergo a strengthening process in order to improve economic performance, promote fiscal responsibility and fight corruption (SIAVELIS, 2000). This necessity is especially the case with horizontal accountability institutions, which are seen as effective mechanisms for controlling corruption (O'DONNELL, 1998; ROSE-ACKERMAN, 1999).In this study, the discussion centers on the articulation of six Brazilian institutions of horizontal accountability - the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (MPF), the Federal Police (PF), the internal control in the Ministries, the Federal Justice (JF), and the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU). The creation of the CGU was an attempt to improve the Brazilian institutional arena in the development of efficient mechanisms to face corruption in the public sector.I am interested in analyzing the CGU findings in its 'Program of Inspections from Public Lotteries', which audits the federal funds transferred to municipalities. In this program, any violations of public sector regulation are reported, and I refer to them as 'irregularities'. The reports also bring the mayors' justifications - and I analyze whether the local public officials are able to provide CGU with a publicly acceptable justification for the reported violation. If the justification is not accepted, I then classify the irregularity as 'corruption'.The objective is to investigate the interactions among those six Brazilian accountability institutions after they receive CGU reports. The six institutions under analysis should be actively connected to control deviations involving federal resources. Since none of them can monitor, investigate and punish corruption individually, it becomes necessary for them to be connected to hold local governments accountable to the federal level. The point advocated here is that, if a federal institution such as the CGU decides to put into practice a program such as the Lottery, - which involves the monitoring of billions of Reais and the allocation of thousands of auditors to the municipalities every year, - the other institutions of the web should not dismiss this effort and ignore the resulting reports.The first part of the paper addresses the idea of a web of accountability institutions, and how this web has matured in Brazil in recent times. The second part provides a description of the accountability institutions under analysis, with special attention to their accountability roles and the main criticisms that they have received. The idea is to give a clear picture of what, exactly, is an ideal trajectory for the cases found by the CGU. The following section focuses on the concept of corruption that is applied in this paper and on how it departs from the mainstream literature. The fourth part describes the methodology of the longitudinal research and what this perspective entailed. Finally, I analyze the flux of the irregularities in the Brazilian web of accountability institutions, especially concerned with the arrival at a timely decision.The web of accountability institutions in BrazilContemporary democracies reaffirm, as a core principle, the idea that rulers should be held accountable by the people, and should be held responsible for their actions and omissions in the exercise of power. The definition of accountability used in this paper follows the ideas of Mark Philp (2009), for whom "A is accountable with respect to M when some individual, body or institution, Y, can require A to inform and explain/justify his or her conduct with respect to M" (PHILP, 2009, p. 32). In this paper, the usage of this definition runs as follows: some federal institutions (Y) impose accountability on the municipal government (A), when considering the application of federal funds in some areas of public policy (M). …
问责制、腐败和地方政府:绘制控制步骤
当我们思考如何改善对腐败的民主控制时,重点往往落在问责制度的变革上。最近的文献表明,在全球改革和民主化的当前阶段,问责制机构必须经历一个加强的过程,以提高经济绩效,促进财政责任和打击腐败(SIAVELIS, 2000)。这种必要性在横向问责机构中尤其如此,横向问责机构被视为控制腐败的有效机制(O'DONNELL, 1998;ROSE-ACKERMAN, 1999)。在本研究中,讨论的重点是六个巴西横向问责机构的衔接——联邦审计法院(TCU)、联邦检察官办公室(MPF)、联邦警察(PF)、各部内部控制、联邦司法部(JF)和总审计署(CGU)。设立中央监察组是为了改善巴西在发展有效机制以对付公共部门腐败方面的体制领域。我有兴趣分析CGU在其“公共彩票检查计划”中的调查结果,该计划对转移到市政当局的联邦资金进行审计。在这个节目中,任何违反公共部门规定的行为都会被报道出来,我把它们称为“违规行为”。这些报告也带来了市长的理由——我分析当地政府官员是否能够为报告的违规行为提供公众可接受的理由。如果这个理由不被接受,那么我就把这种违规行为归类为“腐败”。目的是调查这六个巴西问责机构在收到CGU报告后的相互作用。所分析的六个机构应积极与涉及联邦资源的控制偏差联系起来。由于它们都无法单独监督、调查和惩罚腐败,因此它们之间有必要建立联系,使地方政府对联邦政府负责。这里所提倡的观点是,如果像CGU这样的联邦机构决定实施像彩票这样的项目——这涉及到对数十亿雷亚尔的监控,以及每年向市政当局分配数千名审计员——其他网络机构不应该忽视这一努力,也不应该忽视由此产生的报告。本文的第一部分阐述了问责机构网络的概念,以及这一网络近年来在巴西是如何成熟的。第二部分描述了所分析的问责机构,特别注意它们的问责作用和它们所受到的主要批评。这样做的目的是为CGU发现的案件提供一幅清晰的画面,确切地说,这是一个理想的轨迹。下一节着重于本文中应用的腐败概念,以及它如何偏离主流文献。第四部分描述了纵向研究的方法以及这种观点所包含的内容。最后,我分析了巴西问责机构网络中违规行为的变化,特别是对及时作出决定的关注。当代民主国家重申了一个核心原则,即统治者应该对人民负责,应该对他们在行使权力时的行为和疏忽负责。本文中使用的问责制定义遵循Mark Philp(2009)的观点,他认为“当某些个人、团体或机构Y可以要求A告知并解释/证明他或她的行为与M有关时,A对M负责”(Philp, 2009, p. 32)。在本文中,这一定义的使用如下:一些联邦机构(Y)在考虑联邦资金在某些公共政策领域的应用(M). ...时,对市政府(A)施加问责制
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