Addressing the Climate Problem: Choice between Allowances, Feed-In Tariffs and Taxes

Eirik S. Amundsen, P. Andersen, J. Mortensen
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Instruments chosen to pursue climate related targets are not always efficient. In this paper we consider an economy with three climate related targets for its electricity generation: a given share of “green” electricity, a given expansion of “green” electricity, and a given reduction of “black” (fossil based) electricity. At its disposal the country has three instruments: an allowance system (tradable green certificates), a subsidy system (feed-in tariffs) and a Pigouvian fossil tax. Each of these instruments may be used to attain any of the given targets. Within the setting of the model it is verified that each kind of the target has only a single efficient instrument under certainty, and that there is a deadweight loss of using other instruments to achieve the target. Similarly, there is also an analysis of instrument choice when several targets are to be attained at the same time. The paper also discusses the case of simultaneous targets as well as the relevance of the various targets.
解决气候问题:在配额、上网电价和税收之间做出选择
为实现与气候有关的目标而选择的手段并不总是有效的。在本文中,我们考虑一个具有三个与气候相关的发电目标的经济体:给定的“绿色”电力份额,给定的“绿色”电力扩张,以及给定的“黑色”(基于化石燃料的)电力减少。国家有三种工具可供使用:津贴制度(可交易的绿色证书),补贴制度(上网电价)和庇古化石税。这些工具中的每一个都可以用来达到任何给定的目标。在模型的设置范围内,验证了每种目标在确定的情况下只有一种有效的工具,并且存在使用其他工具来实现目标的无谓损失。同样,当要同时达到几个目标时,也要分析工具的选择。本文还讨论了同时目标的情况以及各种目标的相关性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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