Combatting Anticompetitive Interlocks: Section 8 of the Clayton Act as a Template for Small and Emerging Economies

M. Jacobs
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Interlocking directorates, or management interlocks, appear to be relatively common occurrences in many countries. While the practice generally is not considered to be harmful to competition, interlocks that involve competitors can raise serious concerns because of the potential to facilitate collusion or otherwise contribute to the establishment or maintenance of tacit or oligopolistic coordination. Those concerns may be particularly acute in small economies like Chile, which are characterized by tight oligopolies and limited enforcement resources. While competition authorities in Chile have been able to address competitively troublesome interlocks in a few instances, this paper contends that the current framework there — as it is likely to be in similar small and emerging economies — is inadequate for dealing with the problem in a systematic and cost-effective manner. Rather, it argues that following the model of section 8 of the Clayton Act, with an absolute ban on direct competitor interlocks and perhaps de minimus exceptions tailored for the particular economy, provides a far more useful template to address the issue. Other interlocks that do not involve direct competitors, but that otherwise raise competitive issues, could be addressed under the general competition laws. Such an approach provides an efficient and economical tool for avoiding the potential harms that can accompany anticompetitive interlocks, while still allowing companies to benefit from the practice in situations that are unlikely to raise competitive issues.
打击反竞争联锁:《克莱顿法》第8节作为小型和新兴经济体的模板
联锁理事会或管理联锁在许多国家似乎是相对普遍的现象。虽然这种做法一般不被认为对竞争有害,但涉及竞争对手的联锁可能引起严重关切,因为它有可能促进共谋或以其他方式有助于建立或维持默契或寡头垄断协调。在像智利这样的小经济体中,这些担忧可能尤其严重,因为这些经济体的特点是寡头垄断严重,执法资源有限。虽然智利的竞争管理当局已经能够在少数情况下解决竞争上的麻烦,但本文认为,智利目前的框架——就像在类似的小型和新兴经济体中一样——不足以以系统和具有成本效益的方式处理这个问题。相反,它认为,遵循《克莱顿法》(Clayton Act)第8条的模式,即绝对禁止直接竞争对手联锁,以及可能为特定经济体量身定制的最低限度例外,为解决这一问题提供了一个有用得多的模板。其他不涉及直接竞争对手,但会引起竞争问题的连锁反应,可以根据一般竞争法加以解决。这种方法提供了一种有效而经济的工具,可以避免伴随反竞争联锁而来的潜在危害,同时仍然允许公司在不太可能引发竞争问题的情况下从这种做法中受益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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