{"title":"Combatting Anticompetitive Interlocks: Section 8 of the Clayton Act as a Template for Small and Emerging Economies","authors":"M. Jacobs","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2353703","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Interlocking directorates, or management interlocks, appear to be relatively common occurrences in many countries. While the practice generally is not considered to be harmful to competition, interlocks that involve competitors can raise serious concerns because of the potential to facilitate collusion or otherwise contribute to the establishment or maintenance of tacit or oligopolistic coordination. Those concerns may be particularly acute in small economies like Chile, which are characterized by tight oligopolies and limited enforcement resources. While competition authorities in Chile have been able to address competitively troublesome interlocks in a few instances, this paper contends that the current framework there — as it is likely to be in similar small and emerging economies — is inadequate for dealing with the problem in a systematic and cost-effective manner. Rather, it argues that following the model of section 8 of the Clayton Act, with an absolute ban on direct competitor interlocks and perhaps de minimus exceptions tailored for the particular economy, provides a far more useful template to address the issue. Other interlocks that do not involve direct competitors, but that otherwise raise competitive issues, could be addressed under the general competition laws. Such an approach provides an efficient and economical tool for avoiding the potential harms that can accompany anticompetitive interlocks, while still allowing companies to benefit from the practice in situations that are unlikely to raise competitive issues.","PeriodicalId":424970,"journal":{"name":"Emerging Markets Economics: Industrial Policy & Regulation eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Emerging Markets Economics: Industrial Policy & Regulation eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2353703","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
Interlocking directorates, or management interlocks, appear to be relatively common occurrences in many countries. While the practice generally is not considered to be harmful to competition, interlocks that involve competitors can raise serious concerns because of the potential to facilitate collusion or otherwise contribute to the establishment or maintenance of tacit or oligopolistic coordination. Those concerns may be particularly acute in small economies like Chile, which are characterized by tight oligopolies and limited enforcement resources. While competition authorities in Chile have been able to address competitively troublesome interlocks in a few instances, this paper contends that the current framework there — as it is likely to be in similar small and emerging economies — is inadequate for dealing with the problem in a systematic and cost-effective manner. Rather, it argues that following the model of section 8 of the Clayton Act, with an absolute ban on direct competitor interlocks and perhaps de minimus exceptions tailored for the particular economy, provides a far more useful template to address the issue. Other interlocks that do not involve direct competitors, but that otherwise raise competitive issues, could be addressed under the general competition laws. Such an approach provides an efficient and economical tool for avoiding the potential harms that can accompany anticompetitive interlocks, while still allowing companies to benefit from the practice in situations that are unlikely to raise competitive issues.