Georgetown University Law Center

Colleen Reding
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引用次数: 29

Abstract

Network externalities may lead contracting parties to stay with a “standardized” term despite preferences for another term. Using a dataset of sovereign bond offerings from 1995 to early 2004, we test the importance of standardization for the modification provisions relating to payment terms. We provide evidence that (a) standardization may lead parties to adopt provisions not necessarily out of preference and (b) standards, nonetheless, may change. The process of change, however, is not necessarily quick or straightforward. In the sovereign bond context, change came by way of an “interpretive shock”. Contracts with modification provisions requiring the unanimous consent of bondholders (UACs) suddenly became vulnerable to change with less than unanimous approval through the unexpected use of exit consents. After the shock, sovereigns and investors did not initially react with a significant shift in contract terms. However, we provide evidence that after this initial lull (once investors and sovereign gained experience on the value of allowing modification of payment terms with less than unanimous consent), large shifts in contract terms followed, moving sovereign bond contracts even further away from UACs toward collective action clauses (CACs). We also report evidence that issuer’s attorneys dealing with a high volume of sovereign offerings were the driving factor behind this delayed large shift in contract terms. * Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). ** Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. We thank Ed Bartholomew, Anna Gelpern, Ashoka Mody, Un Kyung Park, Anthony Richards, Anne Salladin, and Ashoka Mody for their advice and comments at multiple stages of the project. Lee Buchheit, Bill Bratton, and Bill Klein are owed special thanks for being willing to answer even our most outlandish and arcane questions regarding the world of bond contracts. Responsibility for errors, however, is ours. We are also grateful to Robert Ahdieh, Albert Choi, Jody Kraus, Kim Krawiec, Herwig Shlunk, Dan Tarullo, Randall Thomas, Robert Thompson, George Triantis, J.B.Ruhl, and participants at presentations at the Vanderbilt Law Shool, the Goergetown Sovereign Debt Conference, and the 2004 American Law and Economics Annual Meeting for comments on the draft. Jack DiMonte, Kevin Hands, Edeanna Johnson, Amita Singh, Mary Thompson, and Emily Zalesky were all generous in their assistance and advice on how best to track down sovereign debt contracts. Our respective law schools (Georgetown and Boalt) provided the financial support that enabled us to put together this project. Finally, our thanks to Jason Medinger, Chris Nace, Ann Kustoff, Chris McLean, Kirsten O’Connell, and the other editors of the Emory Law Journal and the Georgetown Journal of International Law for putting together the Georgetown Sovereign Debt Conference. Note on the Interviews that Served as Background for this paper: The research for this paper required us to conduct numerous interviews with both market participants and policy makers familiar with what went on in the sovereign markets during the 1995-2004 period. Most of these individuals, however, requested that we not directly attribute what was said to them. To the extent possible, therefore, we cite to publicly available documents to make the points in the paper. However, there are some instances where we are unable to provide adequate citations. For most lawyers, the task of reading and revising a boilerplate contract holds less attraction than a visit to the dentist’s office. That is why one of the perks of seniority at a law firm is being able to delegate the “update this old contract for our client” task to the most junior associate. After spending at least one frustrating and sleepless night unsuccessfully trying to decipher what the contract language means, the associate slowly begins to grasp the beauty of boilerplate. And that beauty lies in the realization that there is no need to understand the specifics of what the contract provisions say. After all, it is boilerplate....
乔治敦大学法律中心
网络外部性可能导致缔约各方继续使用“标准化”术语,尽管他们更喜欢另一个术语。使用1995年至2004年初的主权债券发行数据集,我们测试了与支付条款相关的修改条款标准化的重要性。我们提供的证据表明:(a)标准化可能导致各方不一定出于偏好而采用条款;(b)尽管如此,标准可能会发生变化。然而,改变的过程并不一定是快速或直接的。在主权债券领域,变化是以“解释性冲击”的方式出现的。带有修改条款的合同需要债券持有人的一致同意(uac),但由于意外使用了退出同意,在未获得一致同意的情况下,这些合同突然变得容易发生变化。在受到冲击之后,主权国家和投资者最初并没有对合约条款的重大变化做出反应。然而,我们提供的证据表明,在最初的平静之后(一旦投资者和主权国家获得了允许在非一致同意的情况下修改支付条款的价值的经验),合同条款的重大变化随之而来,将主权债券合同从uac进一步转向集体行动条款(CACs)。我们还报告有证据表明,处理大量主权债券发行的发行人律师是合同条款延迟大幅转变背后的驱动因素。Roger J. Traynor法学教授,加州大学伯克利分校(Boalt Hall)。乔治敦法律中心法学教授。我们感谢Ed Bartholomew、Anna Gelpern、Ashoka Mody、Un Kyung Park、Anthony Richards、Anne saladin和Ashoka Mody在项目的多个阶段提供的建议和意见。李·布赫海特、比尔·布拉顿和比尔·克莱因特别感谢他们愿意回答我们关于债券合约世界最古怪、最神秘的问题。然而,错误的责任是我们的。我们还要感谢罗伯特·阿迪耶、阿尔伯特·崔、乔迪·克劳斯、金·克拉维茨、赫韦格·施伦克、丹·塔鲁洛、兰德尔·托马斯、罗伯特·汤普森、乔治·特里安提斯、j.b.鲁尔,以及在范德比尔特法学院、乔治敦主权债务会议和2004年美国法律与经济学年会上发表演讲的与会者对草案提出的意见。杰克·迪蒙特、凯文·汉兹、伊迪安娜·约翰逊、阿米塔·辛格、玛丽·汤普森和艾米丽·扎莱斯基都慷慨地就如何最好地追踪主权债务合同提供了帮助和建议。我们各自的法学院(乔治敦和博尔特)提供了财政支持,使我们能够把这个项目放在一起。最后,我们要感谢Jason Medinger、Chris Nace、Ann Kustoff、Chris McLean、Kirsten O 'Connell以及《Emory Law Journal》和《Georgetown International Law Journal》的其他编辑们组织了这次乔治城主权债务会议。关于作为本文背景的访谈的说明:本文的研究要求我们对1995-2004年期间熟悉主权市场情况的市场参与者和政策制定者进行大量访谈。然而,这些人中的大多数都要求我们不要直接归咎于他们所说的话。因此,在可能的范围内,我们引用了公开可用的文件来说明论文中的观点。然而,在某些情况下,我们无法提供足够的引用。对大多数律师来说,阅读和修改一份合同范本的任务不如去看牙医那么有吸引力。这就是为什么资深律师事务所的特权之一是能够将“为我们的客户更新这份旧合同”的任务委托给资历最浅的律师。在花了至少一个令人沮丧的不眠之夜,试图破译合同语言的含义,但没有成功之后,这位合伙人慢慢开始领会样板文件的美妙之处。这种美妙之处在于,人们意识到没有必要去理解合同条款的具体内容。毕竟,这是一个样板....
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