The association between current earnings surprises and the ex-post bias of concurrently issued management forecasts

Stephen P. Baginski, John L. Campbell, Patrick Ryu, James D. Warren
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Abstract

The vast majority of managers’ earnings forecasts are issued concurrently (i.e., “bundled”) with their firm’s current earnings announcement. We document a predictable bias in these forecasts – the forecasts fail to fully reflect the persistence of the current earnings surprise. Specifically, we find that managers issue (1) optimistically biased forecasts alongside negative earnings surprises and (2) pessimistically biased forecasts alongside large positive earnings surprises. Bayesian updating implies this bias could be unintentional, but we find that the bias is stronger when managers have greater incentives and fewer constraints to issue biased forecasts, suggesting that, to some extent, the bias might be intentional. Relatedly, although managers typically have better information about their firm’s earnings than analysts, we show that analyst reliance on these biased management forecasts represents a mechanism (and an alternative interpretation) for a similar analyst underreaction to current earnings attributed in prior literature to analysts’ cognitive bias. We also find that, on average, investors do not appear to initially understand the bias in these forecasts but eventually unravel it over longer windows. However, investors more quickly unravel the bias when the manager has a history of issuing these biased forecasts and when the firm has relatively more sophisticated investors. Overall, we document that managers’ forecasts appear to repeatedly underweight the persistence of current earnings surprises, are biased in ways that improve investors’ perceptions of managers’ ability, and that this behavior concentrates in subsamples where outsiders have a harder time recognizing any bias.
当期盈利意外与同时发布的管理层预测的事后偏差之间的关系
绝大多数经理人的盈利预测是与公司当前的盈利公告同时发布的(即“捆绑”)。我们在这些预测中记录了一种可预测的偏差——这些预测未能充分反映当前盈利意外的持久性。具体地说,我们发现管理者会发布(1)乐观偏见预测和(2)悲观偏见预测和大量积极收益意外。贝叶斯更新意味着这种偏见可能是无意的,但我们发现,当管理者有更大的激励和更少的约束来发布有偏见的预测时,这种偏见会更强,这表明,在某种程度上,这种偏见可能是有意的。与此相关的是,尽管管理者通常比分析师对公司收益有更好的了解,但我们表明,分析师对这些有偏见的管理层预测的依赖代表了一种机制(和另一种解释),导致分析师对先前文献中归因于分析师认知偏见的当前收益反应不足。我们还发现,平均而言,投资者最初似乎并不理解这些预测中的偏差,但最终会在更长的时间窗口内解开它。然而,当经理有发布这些有偏见的预测的历史,当公司有相对更成熟的投资者时,投资者会更快地解开偏见。总的来说,我们证明了管理者的预测似乎一再低估了当前收益意外的持久性,在提高投资者对管理者能力的看法方面存在偏见,而且这种行为集中在子样本中,外人很难识别任何偏见。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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