Cooperation enforcement in ad hoc networks with penalty

D. Qian, Chi Zhou, Jinsong Zhang
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

To facilitate the multi-hop communications in mobile ad hoc networks, all the nodes in the networks need to cooperate and relay packets for other nodes. Unfortunately, there exist selfish nodes that may refuse to relay packets for others in order to save their own resources such as energy. Those non-cooperative behaviors will lower down the network performance significantly. Therefore, schemes need to be developed to enforce the cooperation of selfish nodes in the multi-hop communications. Credit-based algorithms have been proposed and are considered simple and effective. However, those schemes can lead to unbalanced credit distribution. That is, some nodes in hot areas can easily gain many credits so that they stop relaying for others, while some nodes in cold areas may gain few credits so that they are excluded from the network even if they are willing to cooperate. This paper aims to provide a solution to encourage the nodes in hot areas to stay in the network and help others relay the traffic. We impose a penalty for those non-cooperative nodes in order to force them to participate the communications. To further provide incentive for cooperative nodes to remain cooperative, we propose a game played by the nodes in the same layer. The imposed penalty depends on the outcome of the game. When a node chooses cooperation, the payoff it perceives is the reward from relay minus the cost resulting from the energy loss. When a node chooses not to cooperate, the payoff is the penalty. A node will select the option that generates larger payoff. Simulation results show that our scheme can enforce the nodes in hot areas to cooperate and also encourage cooperative nodes to remain cooperative
特设网络的合作执法与处罚
为了实现移动自组织网络中的多跳通信,网络中的所有节点都需要相互协作,为其他节点转发报文。不幸的是,存在自私的节点,它们可能为了节省自己的资源(如能源)而拒绝为其他节点转发数据包。这些非合作行为会显著降低网络性能。因此,在多跳通信中,需要开发方案来加强自利节点之间的合作。基于信用的算法已经被提出,并且被认为是简单有效的。然而,这些方案可能导致信贷分配不平衡。也就是说,炎热地区的一些节点很容易获得很多积分,从而停止为其他节点中继,而寒冷地区的一些节点可能获得很少的积分,从而被排除在网络之外,即使它们愿意合作。本文旨在提供一种解决方案,以鼓励热点地区的节点留在网络中,并帮助其他节点中继流量。我们对那些不合作的节点施加惩罚,以迫使它们参与通信。为了进一步激励合作节点保持合作,我们提出了一种由同一层的节点进行的博弈。处罚取决于比赛的结果。当一个节点选择合作时,它感知到的收益是中继的回报减去能量损失的代价。当一个节点选择不合作时,其回报就是惩罚。节点将选择产生更大收益的选项。仿真结果表明,该方案既能强制热点区域的节点进行合作,又能鼓励合作节点保持合作状态
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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