New and larger costs of monopoly and tariffs

Staff Report Pub Date : 2012-09-11 DOI:10.21034/sr.468
James A. Schmitz
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

Fifty-eight years ago, Harberger (1954) estimated that the costs of monopoly, which resulted from misallocation of resources across industries, were trivial. Others showed the same was true for tariffs. This research soon led to the consensus that monopoly costs are of little significance—a consensus that persists to this day. ; This paper reports on a new literature that takes a different approach to the costs of monopoly. It examines the costs of monopoly and tariffs within industries. In particular, it examines the histories of industries in which a monopoly is destroyed (or tariffs greatly reduced) and the industry transitions quickly from monopoly to competition. If there are costs to monopoly and high tariffs within industries, we should be able to see these costs whittled away as the monopoly is destroyed. ; In contrast to the prevailing consensus, this new research has identified significant costs of monopoly. Monopoly (and high tariffs) is shown to significantly lower productivity within establishments. It also leads to misallocation within industry: resources are transferred from high to low productivity establishments. ; From these histories a common theme (or theory) emerges as to why monopoly is costly. When a monopoly is created, “rents” are created. Conflict emerges among shareholders, managers, and employees of the monopoly as they negotiate how to divide these rents. Mechanisms are set up to split the rents. These mechanisms are often means to reduce competition among members of the monopoly. Although the mechanisms divide rents, they also destroy them (by leading to low productivity and misallocation).
新的更大的垄断和关税成本
58年前,哈伯格(Harberger, 1954)估计,垄断的成本是微不足道的,而垄断的成本是由资源在各行业的错配造成的。其他人则表示,关税也是如此。这项研究很快得出了一个共识,即垄断成本并不重要——这个共识一直持续到今天。;本文报告了一篇新的文献,该文献对垄断的成本采取了不同的方法。它考察了行业内垄断和关税的成本。特别是,它考察了垄断被破坏(或关税大幅降低)和行业从垄断迅速过渡到竞争的行业的历史。如果行业内的垄断和高关税是有成本的,那么我们应该能够看到,随着垄断的破坏,这些成本会逐渐减少。;与普遍的共识相反,这项新的研究发现了垄断的巨大成本。垄断(和高关税)被证明会显著降低企业内部的生产率。它还导致工业内部分配不当:资源从高生产率企业转移到低生产率企业。;从这些历史中可以得出一个共同的主题(或理论):为什么垄断是昂贵的。当垄断形成时,“租金”就产生了。当垄断企业的股东、管理者和员工协商如何分配这些租金时,冲突就出现了。建立了分配租金的机制。这些机制通常是为了减少垄断企业成员之间的竞争。尽管这些机制会分配租金,但它们也会破坏租金(通过导致低生产率和分配不当)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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