Investment Arbitration Today: Attempting the Reconstruction of the System

E. Masiá
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Abstract

INTRODUCTION On 10 July 2017, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), agreed to initiate work on a possible multilateral reform of investment dispute settlement, including the probable establishment of a multilateral investment court. This follows a formal request from many countries, including the European Union and its Member States, to examine this issue. This is the latest development in a series of setbacks for investorstate dispute settlement (ISDS). Formerly, a number of other states have actively rejected the use of ISDS clauses or significantly limited their scope. Denunciation of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention – Venezuela or Bolivia –, termination of its investment agreements – South Africa or Ecuador –, revision of its model Bilateral Investment Treaty – India –, non-renewal of its investment treaties – Indonesia –, are a few examples of the different approach to solving investorstate disputes and a clear manifestation to break with the current structure and form of international investment law. Simultaneously to all these movements and actions, the idea that emerges is that an ISDS reform is possible from’ within’. Without breaking the current structure, it is possible to evolve and modernise international investment law and arbitration. Despite what has been said before, there is no doubt that in the coming years international arbitration will remain the preferred option for resolving foreign investment disputes and all stakeholders need to ensure it counts among the most effective dispute resolution mechanisms. Only in 2016, 62 new cases were initiated pursuant to International Investment Agreements (IIAs), bringing the total number of known cases to 767. Changing the model would be slow, even if this change finally happens, and it should be borne in mind that the IIAs include sunset clauses with an average duration of 10 to 15 years. This study focuses precisely on analysing the changes that are occurring in this area to try to respond to the criticisms made, without abandoning the model. In this sense, two aspects are the focus of the study. Firstly, the adoption of rules designed specifically to resolve these types of disputes. Secondly, the changes made both in the substantive law of foreign investments and into the ISDS clauses of the IIAs.
投资仲裁的今天:制度重构的尝试
2017年7月10日,联合国国际贸易法委员会(贸易法委员会)同意启动投资争端解决机制可能的多边改革工作,包括可能设立一个多边投资法院。在此之前,包括欧洲联盟及其成员国在内的许多国家正式要求审查这一问题。这是投资者与国家争端解决机制(ISDS)遭遇一系列挫折的最新进展。以前,许多其他国家积极拒绝使用ISDS条款或大大限制其范围。退出国际解决投资争端中心(解决投资争端中心)公约-委内瑞拉或玻利维亚-,终止其投资协定-南非或厄瓜多尔-,修订其示范双边投资条约-印度-,不再延长其投资条约-印度尼西亚-,这些都是解决投资者与国家争端的不同方法的几个例子,也是打破国际投资法目前结构和形式的明确表现。与所有这些运动和行动同时出现的是,ISDS改革可能从“内部”开始。在不打破现有结构的情况下,国际投资法和仲裁的演进和现代化是可能的。尽管之前已经说过,但毫无疑问,在未来几年,国际仲裁仍将是解决外国投资争端的首选,所有利益相关者都需要确保它是最有效的争端解决机制之一。仅在2016年,根据国际投资协定(IIAs)发起的新案件就有62起,使已知案件总数达到767起。即使这种改变最终发生,改变模式也将是缓慢的,而且应该记住,国际投资协定包括平均持续时间为10至15年的日落条款。这项研究的重点是分析这一领域正在发生的变化,试图在不放弃模型的情况下回应批评。从这个意义上说,两个方面是研究的重点。首先,采用专门为解决这类争端而设计的规则。第二,外国投资实体法和国际投资协定的ISDS条款的变化。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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