{"title":"Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Environmental Engagement","authors":"Dongmin Kong, Yanan Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3915366","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of non-executive employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) on corporate environmental engagement. We show that granting ESOPs to non-executive employees promotes greater corporate environmental engagement in terms of environmental protection expenditures, environmental information disclosure, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings. We adopt the two-way fixed-effects model, the propensity score matching (PSM) method, and the instrumental variable approach to alleviate endogeneity concerns. The positive effect of ESOPs is mainly attributable to high-intensity, broad-based, and long-term plans where the incentive effect of ESOPs is sufficiently large to offset the free-rider effect. Furthermore, our findings are particularly pronounced in companies with more intense labor market competition, companies with greater media exposure, and companies in heavy-polluting industries. Overall, this study reveals new evidence of the incentive effect of ESOPs on corporate environmental engagement.","PeriodicalId":388441,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Environment eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"21","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Economy - Development: Environment eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3915366","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
Abstract
This study examines the impact of non-executive employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) on corporate environmental engagement. We show that granting ESOPs to non-executive employees promotes greater corporate environmental engagement in terms of environmental protection expenditures, environmental information disclosure, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings. We adopt the two-way fixed-effects model, the propensity score matching (PSM) method, and the instrumental variable approach to alleviate endogeneity concerns. The positive effect of ESOPs is mainly attributable to high-intensity, broad-based, and long-term plans where the incentive effect of ESOPs is sufficiently large to offset the free-rider effect. Furthermore, our findings are particularly pronounced in companies with more intense labor market competition, companies with greater media exposure, and companies in heavy-polluting industries. Overall, this study reveals new evidence of the incentive effect of ESOPs on corporate environmental engagement.