Pay Harmony? Social Comparison and Performance Compensation in Multi-Business Firms

Claudine Gartenberg, Julie Wulf
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引用次数: 15

Abstract

Our study presents evidence that social comparison influences both the level of pay and the degree of performance sensitivity within firms. We report pay patterns among division managers of large, multibusiness firms over a 14-year period. These patterns are consistent with employees comparing pay against both their peers (horizontal comparison) and the chief executive officer (vertical comparison) within their firm. Horizontal comparison also appears to reduce pay–performance sensitivity, in accord with prior theory proposing that performance pay can lead to perceived pay inequity among employees. Taken together, our evidence suggests that agency costs and social comparison jointly influence pay within firms. The evidence also supports the notion that managers of multibusiness firms are constrained in the degree to which they can incentivize employees, given the firm-imposed reference group.The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2017.1109 .
和谐支付吗?多元企业的社会比较与绩效补偿
我们的研究提供的证据表明,社会比较既影响薪酬水平,也影响企业绩效敏感性的程度。我们报告了大型多业务公司部门经理在14年期间的薪酬模式。这些模式与员工在公司内部与同事(横向比较)和首席执行官(纵向比较)进行薪酬比较是一致的。横向比较似乎也降低了薪酬绩效敏感性,这与先前提出的绩效薪酬可能导致员工之间感知到的薪酬不平等的理论一致。综上所述,我们的证据表明,代理成本和社会比较共同影响企业内部的薪酬。证据还支持这样一种观点,即考虑到公司强加的参照组,多业务公司的管理者在激励员工的程度上受到限制。在线附录可在https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2017.1109上获得。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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