Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive

R. Sachs
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引用次数: 10

Abstract

A problem perennially facing scholars of both intellectual property and health law is the need to incentivize appropriately the development of new pharmaceuticals. Although physicians have an arsenal of drugs to treat conditions like high blood pressure or cholesterol, they lack effective treatments for some of the diseases that are most devastating to our healthcare system. For instance, although many mental health disorders may seem to share little in common with the World Health Organization’s list of Neglected Tropical Diseases, each of these areas is dramatically underserved by present pharmaceutical treatments. These gaps in treatment should not be surprising, given the one-size-fits-all structure of patent law and the various exclusivity provisions implemented by the FDA. These two incentive systems have failed to incentivize the development of drugs for diseases with certain features — most notably, those that primarily affect poor populations. Alternative mechanisms can be more narrowly tailored to achieve these goals. One major potential source of incentives has been almost completely absent from the legal literature: prescription drug insurance. This Article examines the ways in which prescription drug insurance might compensate for the innovation distortions created by patent law and FDA regulation. It first explores insurance’s potential theoretically, considering the ways in which it might provide a targeted incentive for innovation. This Article then considers a specific instance of this general principle: prescription drug insurance through Medicaid in the United States. The way in which Medicaid pays for drugs enables needy patients to access existing treatments, but it perversely decreases incentives for innovation into drugs that would primarily be prescribed for low-income Americans — like those for many mental health disorders or Neglected Tropical Diseases. This Article proposes altering Medicaid’s prescription drug rebate system to reward innovators who develop drugs for diseases primarily affecting low-income populations.
奖励保险:处方药保险作为创新激励
知识产权和卫生法学者长期面临的一个问题是,需要适当地激励新药品的开发。尽管医生们有大量的药物来治疗高血压或胆固醇等疾病,但对于一些对我们的医疗系统最具破坏性的疾病,他们缺乏有效的治疗方法。例如,尽管许多精神疾病似乎与世界卫生组织被忽视的热带病清单没有什么共同之处,但目前的药物治疗对这些领域的服务都严重不足。考虑到专利法的一刀切结构和FDA实施的各种排他性条款,这些治疗上的差距不应该令人惊讶。这两种激励制度未能激励开发治疗具有某些特征的疾病的药物,尤其是那些主要影响贫困人口的疾病。其他机制可以更狭义地加以调整,以实现这些目标。一个主要的潜在激励来源几乎完全没有出现在法律文献中:处方药保险。本文考察了处方药保险可能补偿专利法和FDA法规造成的创新扭曲的方式。它首先从理论上探讨了保险的潜力,考虑了它可能为创新提供有针对性的激励的方式。本文随后考虑了这一普遍原则的一个具体实例:美国通过医疗补助计划实施的处方药保险。医疗补助计划支付药物的方式使有需要的病人能够获得现有的治疗方法,但它反常地减少了对药物创新的激励,这些药物主要是为低收入美国人开的处方——比如治疗许多精神疾病或被忽视的热带疾病的药物。本文建议改变医疗补助的处方药回扣制度,以奖励那些为主要影响低收入人群的疾病开发药物的创新者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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