Analysis of via-resolver DNS TXT queries and detection possibility of botnet communications

Hikaru Ichise, Yong Jin, K. Iida
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引用次数: 17

Abstract

Recent reports on Internet security have indicated that the DNS (Domain Name System) protocol is being used for botnet communication in various botnets; in particular, botnet communication based on DNS TXT record type has been observed as a new technique in some botnet-based cyber attacks. One of the most fundamental Internet protocols, the DNS protocol is used for basic name resolution as well as many Internet services, so it is not possible to simply block out all DNS traffic. To block out only malicious DNS TXT record based botnet communications, it would be necessary to distinguish them from legitimate DNS traffic involving DNS TXT records. However, the DNS TXT record is also used in many legitimate ways since this type is allowed to include any plain text up to a fairly long length. In this paper, we mainly focus on the usage of the DNS TXT record and explain our analysis using about 5.5 million real DNS TXT record queries obtained for over 3 months in our campus network. Based on the analysis findings, we discuss a new method to detect botnet communication. Our analysis results show that 330 unique destination IP addresses (cover approximately 22.1% of unknown usages of DNS TXT record queries) may have been involved in malicious communications and this proportion is a reasonable basis for network administrators to perform detailed manual checking in many organizations.
通过解析器DNS TXT查询的分析和僵尸网络通信的检测可能性
最近关于互联网安全的报告表明,各种僵尸网络正在使用DNS(域名系统)协议进行僵尸网络通信;特别是基于DNS TXT记录类型的僵尸网络通信,在一些基于僵尸网络的网络攻击中被发现是一种新技术。作为最基本的互联网协议之一,DNS协议用于基本的名称解析以及许多互联网服务,因此不可能简单地阻止所有DNS流量。为了只阻止恶意的基于DNS TXT记录的僵尸网络通信,有必要将它们与涉及DNS TXT记录的合法DNS流量区分开来。然而,DNS TXT记录也以许多合法的方式使用,因为这种类型允许包含任何长度相当长的纯文本。在本文中,我们主要关注DNS TXT记录的使用情况,并使用我们校园网3个多月来获得的约550万次真实DNS TXT记录查询来解释我们的分析。在此基础上,提出了一种检测僵尸网络通信的新方法。我们的分析结果显示,330个唯一的目标IP地址(约占未知DNS TXT记录查询使用的22.1%)可能涉及恶意通信,这一比例是网络管理员在许多组织中执行详细手动检查的合理基础。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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