The Sun and the Good

Abstract

Explains and reveals the limitations of the first in the sequence of Plato’s three images of cognition and education: the simile of the sun and the good. Shows how this simile continues Plato’s epistemology of cognitive powers, and also shows how the role of truth in Plato’s epistemology is very different from the way it figures in contemporary epistemology. Introduces Plato’s idea of thinking as a first step in summoning the power of knowledge. Plato has Socrates and Glaucon come to an impasse when Glaucon wishes to hear about what Socrates thinks about what the good is, which they agree should be the highest study of the philosopher-rulers. Socrates balks at this, not wishing to speak of the good as if he knew what it is. But Glaucon presses, insisting that they should at least discuss the good in the ways in which they have already discussed justice and moderation. A middle ground is thus indicated between just comparing opinions on a subject without knowledge, and the sort of knowledge that philosopher-rulers will have, but which Socrates and Glaucon lack. The discussion of the good, then, falls into this middle ground, as do the earlier discussions of justice and moderation.