ECONOMIC THEORY CONCEPTS

Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI:10.1142/9789813141230_0003

Henry Tulkens

{"title":"ECONOMIC THEORY CONCEPTS","authors":"Henry Tulkens","doi":"10.1142/9789813141230_0003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The following sections are included:The purpose and the messageEquilibriaAlternative individual country behaviors“Business as usual” (BAU) behaviorIndividual environmentally nationalistic behaviorStandard economic properties of an individual environmentally nationalistic equilibriumOther general properties of an individual environmentally nationalistic equilibriumInternational equilibriaThe “Business as usual” international equilibriumThe international environmentally nationalistic equilibriumStandard economic properties of an international environmentally nationalistic equilibriumOther general properties of an environmentally nationalistic international equilibriumEquilibria and the right to polluteEfficiencyInternational efficiencyEconomic properties of an efficient stateOther general properties of an efficient stateMultiple efficient statesEfficiency and the right to polluteThe issue of equityThe rationale for cooperationInefficiency and environmental abuse of equilibria with externalitiesThe ecological surplus to be sharedModalities of cooperationWho owns the right to pollute internationally?The assignment of rights issueRights are wealthRights vs. responsibilityTreaties as contractsThe likely outcomeThe processObstacles to cooperationThe informational problemsThe value of “environmental” goodsThe extreme difficulty of measurementWillingness to payWTP for what?Informational free ridingNon-participatory free ridingConcluding summary and problems left openAnnex: Analytical formulation of the one polluter (r)–one pollutee (e) reference model","PeriodicalId":124538,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813141230_0003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The following sections are included:The purpose and the messageEquilibriaAlternative individual country behaviors“Business as usual” (BAU) behaviorIndividual environmentally nationalistic behaviorStandard economic properties of an individual environmentally nationalistic equilibriumOther general properties of an individual environmentally nationalistic equilibriumInternational equilibriaThe “Business as usual” international equilibriumThe international environmentally nationalistic equilibriumStandard economic properties of an international environmentally nationalistic equilibriumOther general properties of an environmentally nationalistic international equilibriumEquilibria and the right to polluteEfficiencyInternational efficiencyEconomic properties of an efficient stateOther general properties of an efficient stateMultiple efficient statesEfficiency and the right to polluteThe issue of equityThe rationale for cooperationInefficiency and environmental abuse of equilibria with externalitiesThe ecological surplus to be sharedModalities of cooperationWho owns the right to pollute internationally?The assignment of rights issueRights are wealthRights vs. responsibilityTreaties as contractsThe likely outcomeThe processObstacles to cooperationThe informational problemsThe value of “environmental” goodsThe extreme difficulty of measurementWillingness to payWTP for what?Informational free ridingNon-participatory free ridingConcluding summary and problems left openAnnex: Analytical formulation of the one polluter (r)–one pollutee (e) reference model

查看原文本刊更多论文

经济理论概念

包括以下部分:目的和信息均衡个别国家的替代行为“照常营业”(BAU)行为个体环境民族主义行为个体环境民族主义均衡的标准经济属性个体环境民族主义均衡的一般属性国际均衡“照常营业”国际均衡国际环境民族主义均衡国际环境民族主义均衡的标准经济属性环境民族主义国际均衡的一般属性均衡和污染权效率国际效率高效国家的经济属性高效国家的其他一般属性多重高效国家效率和污染权公平问题合作的基本原理效率低下和环境滥用外部性均衡生态盈余共享合作模式谁拥有国际污染的权利?权利的分配权利是财富权利与责任条约是合同可能的结果过程合作的障碍信息问题“环境”物品的价值测量的极端困难愿意为什么支付wtp ?信息搭便车非参与性搭便车结论性总结和遗留问题附件:一个污染者(r) -一个污染者(e)参考模型的分析公式

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements

自引率

0.00%

发文量