Selfish allocation avoidance for P2P file application: A game theoretic approach

Abstract

In this paper, we focus and solve the selfish allocation-problem that is different from the previously studied version in three ways that make it more accurately reflective of real world P2P allocation: (1) we treat the nodes as strategic agents and treat the replica allocation as a deliberate auction where node is incentivized to give his true quality of service for getting the replica; (2) our mechanism computes node utility for all possible replica destination and payments for those destination nodes, and the best appropriate node can be selected as the final placement destination (3) we show how to compute our mechanism with a distributed algorithm that is a straightforward extension to P2P allocation method and causes a overhead in convergence time. This approach of using an existing protocol as a substrate for distributed computation may prove useful in future development of P2P allocation algorithms. Our design and analysis of a strategy proof, feasible, VCG-based routing mechanism provides a new, promising direction in distributed algorithmic mechanism design, which has heretofore been focused mainly on P2P application.