Empirical Study on Effect of Managerial Discretion on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity

2008 International Conference on Risk Management & Engineering Management Pub Date : 2008-11-04 DOI:10.1109/ICRMEM.2008.23

Changzheng Zhang, Jie Xie

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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Literatures have discussed the effect of many variables, such as firm size, firm risk and industry features etc., on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. However, it is indicated that the fact of persistent low CEO pay-performance sensitivity is still not explained effectively. From the perspective of internal governance structure, the paper takes managerial discretion, a variable most comprehensively reflecting corporate governance quality, as the critical influencing variable, and focuses on its effect on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Based on the literature review and theoretical analysis, a hypothesis holding that managerial discretion can manipulate CEO pay-performance sensitivity negatively and significantly is proposed. Finally, by applying the data of 784 Chinese listed firms both of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2004, the paper empirically proves that managerial discretion can negatively manipulate CEO pay-performance sensitivity significantly and high managerial discretion without effective monitoring is the critical factor of persistent low CEO pay-performance sensitivity.

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管理层自由裁量权对CEO薪酬绩效敏感性影响的实证研究

文献讨论了企业规模、企业风险、行业特征等诸多变量对CEO薪酬绩效敏感性的影响。然而，研究表明，CEO薪酬绩效敏感性持续低的事实仍然没有得到有效的解释。本文从内部治理结构的角度出发，将最全面反映公司治理质量的管理自由裁量权作为关键影响变量，重点研究其对CEO薪酬绩效敏感性的影响。在文献综述和理论分析的基础上，本文提出了管理层自由裁量权对CEO薪酬绩效敏感性具有负向且显著的操纵作用的假设。最后，本文运用2004年上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所784家中国上市公司的数据，实证证明了管理层自由裁量权对CEO薪酬绩效敏感性具有显著的负向操纵作用，且缺乏有效监控的高管理层自由裁量权是CEO薪酬绩效敏感性持续低的关键因素。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

2008 International Conference on Risk Management & Engineering Management

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