Living with anti-pluralist populism in Europe:

B. Crum
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Abstract

Never before did a Dutch election attract as much attention from foreign media as the one on 15 March 2017. Journalists swarmed to the Netherlands, driven by one big question: Will Geert Wilders win? Wilders became a topic of particular interest thanks to the dramatic votes of 2016: the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. The prospect thus lured that the Netherlands would see a similar dramatic turn-around, one that would be indicative of a transnational ‘rise of populism’. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte qualified – and dismissed – such expectations as a ‘domino theory’ which suggests that with one or two countries falling prey to populist movements, the rest will follow automatically (Jonker 2017). Eventually, Wilders was not the big victor of 15 March. He got 13.3 percent of the vote-share, corresponding to 20 of the 150 seats in the Dutch Lower House, which is five seats more than he got at the previous elections in 2012 but four less than his best result to date in 2010. What is more, the Freedom Party certainly did not become the biggest party, and it was effectively side-lined from the government to be formed. Ironically, soon, commentators started to float a reverse domino theory, in which the relative loss of Wilders was prefigured by the win of Alexander Van der Bellen of the presidential elections in Austria and followed in May 2017 by the victory of Emanuel Macron over Marine Le Pen in the French presidential elections. However, if anything, the experience of the Dutch elections signals the normalization of anti-pluralist populism, even if they do not come out victorious. While for a long time, anti-pluralist populist parties could still be treated as an aberration and a rather marginal phenomenon, recent elections indicate that they are there to stay as a significant political force in many political systems. Considerable attention has been devoted to those EU member states, Hungary and Poland, in which we witness actual backsliding
与欧洲反多元民粹主义共存:
2017年3月15日的荷兰大选吸引了外国媒体前所未有的关注。记者们蜂拥而至荷兰,被一个大问题所驱使:吉尔特·威尔德斯(Geert Wilders)会赢吗?由于2016年的戏剧性投票:英国脱欧公投和唐纳德·特朗普当选美国总统,威尔德斯成为了一个特别感兴趣的话题。因此,荷兰的前景可能会出现类似的戏剧性转变,这将是跨国“民粹主义崛起”的标志。荷兰首相马克·吕特(Mark Rutte)认为这种预期是“多米诺骨牌理论”,即一两个国家成为民粹主义运动的牺牲品,其他国家也会自动效仿(Jonker 2017)。最终,威尔德斯并不是3月15日的大赢家。他获得了13.3%的选票,相当于荷兰下议院150个席位中的20个,这比他在2012年的选举中获得的席位多了5个,但比他在2010年的最佳成绩少了4个。更重要的是,自由党当然没有成为最大的政党,它实际上被排除在即将组建的政府之外。具有讽刺意味的是,很快,评论人士开始提出一种反向多米诺骨牌理论,认为亚历山大·范德贝伦在奥地利总统选举中获胜预示了威尔德斯的相对失败,随后在2017年5月,伊曼纽尔·马克龙在法国总统选举中战胜了马琳·勒庞。然而,如果说有什么不同的话,那就是荷兰选举的经验标志着反多元民粹主义的正常化,即使他们没有取得胜利。虽然在很长一段时间内,反多元化的民粹主义政党仍然可以被视为一种失常和相当边缘的现象,但最近的选举表明,它们将在许多政治制度中作为一股重要的政治力量继续存在。对欧盟成员国匈牙利和波兰给予了相当大的关注,我们看到这些国家实际出现倒退
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