Probabilistic Disclosure: Maximisation vs. Minimisation

B. Bérard, S. Haddad, Engel Lefaucheux
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

We consider opacity questions where an observation function provides to an external attacker a view of the states along executions and secret executions are those visiting some state from a fixed subset. Disclosure occurs when the observer can deduce from a finite observation that the execution is secret, the e-disclosure variant corresponding to the execution being secret with probability greater than 1 − e. In a probabilistic and non deterministic setting, where an internal agent can choose between actions, there are two points of view, depending on the status of this agent: the successive choices can either help the attacker trying to disclose the secret, if the system has been corrupted, or they can prevent disclosure as much as possible if these choices are part of the system design. In the former situation, corresponding to a worst case, the disclosure value is the supremum over the strategies of the probability to disclose the secret (maximisation), whereas in the latter case, the disclosure is the infimum (minimisation). We address quantitative problems (comparing the optimal value with a threshold) and qualitative ones (when the threshold is zero or one) related to both forms of disclosure for a fixed or finite horizon. For all problems, we characterise their decidability status and their complexity. We discover a surprising asymmetry: on the one hand optimal strategies may be chosen among deterministic ones in maximisation problems, while it is not the case for minimisation. On the other hand, for the questions addressed here, more minimisation problems than maximisation ones are decidable.
概率披露:最大化vs.最小化
我们考虑不透明问题,其中观察函数向外部攻击者提供执行状态的视图,而秘密执行是从固定子集访问某些状态的执行。当观察者可以从有限的观察中推断出执行是秘密的时,披露就发生了,与执行相对应的电子披露变体的保密概率大于1 - e。在概率和非确定性设置中,内部代理可以在行动之间进行选择,根据该代理的状态,有两种观点:如果系统已被破坏,则连续的选择可以帮助攻击者试图泄露秘密,或者如果这些选择是系统设计的一部分,则可以尽可能地防止泄露。在前一种情况下,对应于最坏的情况,披露值是披露秘密概率策略的最高值(最大化),而在后一种情况下,披露值是最小值(最小化)。我们解决了定量问题(将最优值与阈值进行比较)和定性问题(当阈值为零或1时),这些问题与固定或有限范围内的两种披露形式有关。对于所有问题,我们都描述了它们的可决性和复杂性。我们发现了一个令人惊讶的不对称性:一方面,在最大化问题中,最优策略可以在确定性策略中选择,而最小化问题则不是这样。另一方面,对于这里讨论的问题,最小化问题比最大化问题更多是可确定的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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