Moore’s Hands

Abstract

This essay suggests that the long, somewhat tedious run-up to the proof in Moore’s ‘A proof of an external world’ is designed to prepare the ground with common sense and experimentation (with after-images). Given that perspective, the proof, when it finally arrives, is necessarily trivial; the question is whether the skeptic can budge Moore from his home ground. Moore acknowledges that he can’t ‘prove’ his premises, because he can’t ‘prove’ he’s not dreaming, but nevertheless insists that he has conclusive evidence that he’s not dreaming and that asking for more is misguided. Precisely why it’s misguided is explicit in his lectures of 1933–1934, where Moore reasons ‘there are millions of stars’ is an established conclusion of astronomy: if the philosopher asserts it, he’s just repeating what the astronomers have already said; if he denies it, he’s contradicting the astronomers. Moore is more naturalistic than is often appreciated.