A Brain Listening to Itself

Abstract

The ubiquitous presence of ambiguous voices in Beckett’s work remains an enduring mystery. The narrative work is no exception, to the point that Beckett’s fiction after Murphy (1938) can be read as, to quote The Unnamable (1953), “entirely a matter of voices; no other metaphor is appropriate” (319). Given the alien qualities of these voices, their intrusive independent agency, and their sometimes tormenting phenomenology, two frameworks of interpretation have so far prevailed. On the one hand, there are narratologists such as Brian Richardson (2006) who have proposed an “unnatural” reading of these voices, by arguing that these alien, multiple, sourceless voices cannot be traced back or ascribed to any actual experience within the human domain; that they cannot be “naturalized” (Culler 1975; 2018; see also Fludernik 1996) by the reader. On the other hand, there is a long-standing “pathological” framework, which sees voices in Beckett’s work as a fictional rendering of a wide range of experiences associated with mental illnesses, mostly of auditory-verbal hallucinations (AVHs) typical of schizophrenia. This chapter suggests that an alternative, natural, and non-pathological experience is the target of Beckett’s fictional cognitive models having voices as core modeling elements. By drawing on contemporary cognitive research on inner speech (roughly speaking, the activity of silently talking to, with and within oneself), it is advocated that voices in Beckett’s models target the working of inner speech, only defamiliarized or, as we shall see, “detuned” as a modeling alteration to explore its functioning within human cognition.