{"title":"Benchmarking Audit Committee Effectiveness in the UK","authors":"J. Song, Brian Windram","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.249865","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper adopts the benchmarking approach to study audit committee effectiveness in the UK. Using FRRP sample spanning a decade from 1990 to 2000, this paper investigates factors leading to the violation of accounting and financial reporting standards by UK firms. Our binary logit regression suggest the following results: First, smaller boards provide better incentive for monitoring; Second, consistent with previous studies, board and committee independence enhances reduce the likelihood of financial reporting problems; Third, contrary to popular suggestions, director share ownership might cause non-compliance with standards; Forth, outside directorships seem to enable non-executive directors to gain monitoring experience more quickly and is conductive to better financial reporting; Fifth, financial literacy and audit committee meeting frequency all reduce the probability of standard violations in financial reporting.","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2000-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"18","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.249865","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 18
Abstract
This paper adopts the benchmarking approach to study audit committee effectiveness in the UK. Using FRRP sample spanning a decade from 1990 to 2000, this paper investigates factors leading to the violation of accounting and financial reporting standards by UK firms. Our binary logit regression suggest the following results: First, smaller boards provide better incentive for monitoring; Second, consistent with previous studies, board and committee independence enhances reduce the likelihood of financial reporting problems; Third, contrary to popular suggestions, director share ownership might cause non-compliance with standards; Forth, outside directorships seem to enable non-executive directors to gain monitoring experience more quickly and is conductive to better financial reporting; Fifth, financial literacy and audit committee meeting frequency all reduce the probability of standard violations in financial reporting.