{"title":"The Self","authors":"Mattia Riccardi","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198803287.003.0008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that Nietzsche distinguishes (in particular, in his Zarathustra) between the bodily self that is constituted by the drives and affects and the reflectively conscious self. According to the reading proposed by the author, the latter depends on the former. More precisely, the reflectively conscious self is just the personal-level upshot of the subpersonal order among drives and affects. The chapter also addresses Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the intuitive but mistaken conception of the conscious self as independent from our bodily constitution, and his belief that the sui generis usage of the first-person pronoun is among the sources of this illusion.","PeriodicalId":406830,"journal":{"name":"Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198803287.003.0008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter argues that Nietzsche distinguishes (in particular, in his Zarathustra) between the bodily self that is constituted by the drives and affects and the reflectively conscious self. According to the reading proposed by the author, the latter depends on the former. More precisely, the reflectively conscious self is just the personal-level upshot of the subpersonal order among drives and affects. The chapter also addresses Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the intuitive but mistaken conception of the conscious self as independent from our bodily constitution, and his belief that the sui generis usage of the first-person pronoun is among the sources of this illusion.