Real-time Detection of False Data Injection Attacks Based on Load Forecasting in Smart Grid

Yueyu Deng, K. Zhu, Ran Wang, Yong Wan
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Application of computing and communications intelligence has increase the openness and complexity of smart grid to a higher degree. However, this shift also makes smart grids more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Recently, a new type of invisible attack called false data injection attack (FDIA) has been proposed, which can bypass the existing bad data detection and inject false data into the grid measurements. However, most existing work ignore the potential different purposes of FDIA attacks, and simply assuming the purpose as power theft. In this paper, we model two FDIA attacks based on different purposes, one for economic interests, another for destruction. In order to detect these two attacks, we propose a load forecasting based technique for real-time FDIA detection. Firstly, a support vector regression (SVR) is exploit to forecast the load. According to the predicted results and the system model of the power grid, the measurements of the entire smart grid can be calculate by power flow algorithm. Compared with forecasting measurements directly, the computation cost of this method is very small. Then we train a support vector machine (SVM) to detect the potential FDIA attacks based on deviation between the deduced measurements and the true value. Besides, the injection process is also considered in training phase, thus FDIA attacks can be captured in advance. The performance of our proposed detection mechanism is illustrated through the simulation by IEEE 57-bus test system.
基于负荷预测的智能电网虚假数据注入攻击实时检测
计算智能和通信智能的应用提高了智能电网的开放性和复杂性。然而,这种转变也使智能电网更容易受到网络攻击。近年来,人们提出了一种新的不可见攻击——虚假数据注入攻击(FDIA),它可以绕过现有的不良数据检测方法,将虚假数据注入网格测量中。然而,大多数现有工作忽略了FDIA攻击的潜在不同目的,并简单地假设其目的是窃取电力。在本文中,我们基于不同的目的建立了两个FDIA攻击模型,一个是为了经济利益,另一个是为了破坏。为了检测这两种攻击,我们提出了一种基于负载预测的实时FDIA检测技术。首先,利用支持向量回归(SVR)对负荷进行预测。根据预测结果和电网的系统模型,利用潮流算法计算整个智能电网的测量值。与直接预测测量相比,该方法的计算量很小。然后,我们训练支持向量机(SVM),根据推断的测量值与真实值之间的偏差来检测潜在的FDIA攻击。此外,在训练阶段还考虑了注入过程,因此可以提前捕获FDIA攻击。通过IEEE 57总线测试系统的仿真,验证了该检测机制的性能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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