Research on Delocalization of Ethnic Villages Based on Evolutionary Game Analysis

Abstract

“Delocalization” has been a serious problem in tourism development. For solving the phenomenon, this paper established an Evolutionary Game Model which includes local governments and tourism enterprises. Based on the assumption of Bounded Rational Hypothesis, this research analyzes the decision-making basis and behavioral game of each subject in the evolution of the localization problem of ethnic villages. And further, using replicated dynamic equations , discusses some factors effecting the behavior of the main body by analyzing stability of the equilibrium point in the system. The result shows that local government’s strategic choice plays a vital role in the Evolutionary Game Model and relates to the strategic choices among Tourism Companies. In additional, punitive incentives can have more influence on the behavior of the Game Subjects and play an important role in the stability evolution of the model. Finally, the social forces represented by tourists and public have a certain impact on the stability of system evolutions. Keywords—Ethnic Villages; Delocalization; Game Theory