{"title":"Outsourcing in the International Mutual Fund Industry: An Equilibrium View","authors":"O. Chuprinin, M. Massa, David Schumacher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1943479","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\"> We study outsourcing relationships among international asset management firms. We find that, in companies that manage both outsourced and in-house funds, in-house funds outperform outsourced funds by 0.85% annually (57% of the expense ratio). We attribute this result to preferential treatment of in-house funds via the preferential allocation of IPOs, trading opportunities, and cross-trades, especially at times when in-house funds face steep outflows and require liquidity. We explain preferential treatment with agency problems: it increases with the subcontractor's market power and the difficulty of monitoring the subcontractor, and decreases with the subcontractor's amount of parallel in-house activity.","PeriodicalId":145187,"journal":{"name":"Paris December 2011 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI (Archive)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"55","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Paris December 2011 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI (Archive)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1943479","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 55
Abstract
type="main"> We study outsourcing relationships among international asset management firms. We find that, in companies that manage both outsourced and in-house funds, in-house funds outperform outsourced funds by 0.85% annually (57% of the expense ratio). We attribute this result to preferential treatment of in-house funds via the preferential allocation of IPOs, trading opportunities, and cross-trades, especially at times when in-house funds face steep outflows and require liquidity. We explain preferential treatment with agency problems: it increases with the subcontractor's market power and the difficulty of monitoring the subcontractor, and decreases with the subcontractor's amount of parallel in-house activity.