Joint ordering policy for a conditional trade credit model with two retailers

Zhen Zhang, Songtao Zhang, M. Yue
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Abstract

This paper focuses on the cooperation mechanism between two retailers. To reduce the average processing cost, the supplier usually sets a threshold for trade credit to stimulate retailers' orders. Retailers can enjoy permissible delay in payments only when their order quantities are more than or equal to the given threshold. However, considering the diversity of retailers, the motivation effect of the threshold may be limited. To resolve the problem, the supplier can additionally provide retailers with a joint ordering policy under which two retailers can make delayed payments as long as their total order quantity meets the required threshold. Thus, the two retailers should decide whether to place a joint order or not and determine their respective order quantities simultaneously. We provide a mutually acceptable order-allocation scheme for retailers, and determine the optimal payment methods for them. In addition, an optimal threshold is identified for the supplier to maximize the total order quantity of retailers. Based on this, some managerial insights are obtained. A numerical experiment is performed to illustrate the validity of the model.
有两个零售商的有条件贸易信用模型的联合订购策略
本文主要研究两家零售商之间的合作机制。为了降低平均加工成本,供应商通常设定一个贸易信用门槛来刺激零售商的订单。只有当零售商的订单数量大于或等于给定的阈值时,零售商才能享受允许的付款延迟。然而,考虑到零售商的多样性,门槛的激励作用可能有限。为了解决这一问题,供应商还可以为零售商提供一种联合订货策略,在这种策略下,只要两个零售商的总订货数量达到要求的阈值,他们就可以延迟付款。因此,两家零售商应决定是否联合下单,并同时确定各自的订单数量。我们为零售商提供一个双方都能接受的订单分配方案,并确定他们的最佳支付方式。此外,还确定了供应商的最优阈值,使零售商的总订单量最大化。在此基础上,获得了一些管理见解。通过数值实验验证了该模型的有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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