The Role of Board Leadership Structure in Firm Governance

Danuse Bement, Ryan Krause
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Abstract

Boards of directors are governing bodies that reside at the apex of the modern corporation. Boards monitor the behavior of firm management, provide managers access to knowledge, expertise, and external networks, and serve as advisors and sounding boards for the CEO. Board attributes such as board size and independence, director demographics, and firm ownership have all been studied as antecedents of effective board functioning and, ultimately, firm performance. Steady progress has been made toward understanding how boards influence firm outcomes, but several key questions about board leadership structure remain unresolved. Research on board leadership structure encompasses the study of board chairs, lead independent directors, and board committees. Board chair research indicates that when held by competent individuals, this key leadership position has the potential to contribute to efficient board functioning and firm performance. Researchers have found conflicting evidence regarding CEO duality, the practice of the CEO also serving as the board chair. The effect of this phenomenon—once ubiquitous among U.S. boards—ranges widely based on circumstances such as board independence, CEO power, and/or environmental conditions. Progressively, however, potential negative consequences of CEO duality proposed by agency theory appear to be counterbalanced by other governance mechanisms and regulatory changes. A popular mechanism for a compromise between the benefits of CEO duality and independent monitoring is to establish the role of a lead independent director. Although research on this role is in its early stage, results suggest that when implemented properly, the lead independent director can aid board monitoring without adding confusion to a unified chain of command. Board oversight committees, another key board leadership mechanism, improve directors’ access to information, enhance decision-making quality by allowing directors to focus on specialized topics outside of board meetings, and increase the speed of response to critical matters. Future research on the governance roles of boards, leadership configurations, and board committees is likely to explore theories beyond agency and resource dependence, as well as rely less on collecting archival data and more on finding creative ways to access rarely examined board interactions, such as board and committee meetings and executive sessions.
董事会领导结构在公司治理中的作用
董事会是位于现代公司最高层的管理机构。董事会监督公司管理层的行为,为管理者提供获取知识、专业知识和外部网络的途径,并充当首席执行官的顾问和传声筒。董事会规模和独立性、董事人口统计数据和公司所有权等董事会属性都被研究为董事会有效运作和最终公司绩效的先决条件。在了解董事会如何影响公司业绩方面取得了稳步进展,但有关董事会领导结构的几个关键问题仍未得到解决。董事会领导结构的研究包括对董事会主席、首席独立董事和董事会委员会的研究。董事会主席的研究表明,当由有能力的人担任时,这一关键的领导职位有可能有助于董事会有效运作和公司绩效。研究人员发现了关于CEO双重性的相互矛盾的证据,即CEO同时担任董事会主席的做法。这种曾经在美国董事会中普遍存在的现象的影响,在很大程度上取决于董事会独立性、CEO权力和/或环境条件等情况。然而,代理理论提出的CEO二元性的潜在负面影响似乎逐渐被其他治理机制和监管变化所抵消。在CEO双重身份和独立监督的好处之间达成妥协的一种流行机制是设立首席独立董事的角色。尽管对这一角色的研究还处于早期阶段,但结果表明,如果实施得当,首席独立董事可以帮助董事会监督,而不会给统一的指挥链增加混乱。董事会监督委员会是另一个重要的董事会领导机制,它改善了董事对信息的获取,通过让董事专注于董事会会议以外的专业议题来提高决策质量,并提高了对关键事项的反应速度。未来对董事会治理角色、领导配置和董事会委员会的研究可能会探索超越代理和资源依赖的理论,以及减少对收集档案数据的依赖,更多地依赖于寻找创造性的方式来获取很少被审查的董事会互动,例如董事会和委员会会议以及执行会议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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