Facilitating fault tree preparation and review by applying complementary event logic

M. A. Burkett
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This paper describes a simple analysis and documentation procedure which can help ensure the completeness and accuracy of fault tree analysis, and thus help assure the safety of the corresponding product or system. With this procedure, each layer of the fault tree which feeds into an OR gate is structured to comprise a complete theoretical set. This is done, generally, by first including the most significant or most obvious failure contributor, and then using complementary event logic to define a second failure contributor which includes all possibilities except the one already covered. A simple example of using complementary event logic in this way would be an OR gate with the contributors: (1) "valve commanded closed"; and (2) "valve closes even though not commanded". Another example would be an OR gate with the contributors: (1) "software logic satisfied to generate a valve close command"; and (2) "a valve close command is generated even though the software logic is not satisfied". Fault trees prepared in this way are inherently complete, and are more amenable for review.
通过应用互补的事件逻辑,简化故障树的准备和审查
本文描述了一个简单的分析和记录程序,可以帮助确保故障树分析的完整性和准确性,从而有助于确保相应产品或系统的安全性。在这个过程中,输入OR门的故障树的每一层都被构造成一个完整的理论集。通常,首先包括最重要或最明显的失败贡献者,然后使用互补的事件逻辑来定义第二个失败贡献者,它包括除了前面提到的那个之外的所有可能性。以这种方式使用互补事件逻辑的一个简单示例是带有贡献者的OR门:(1)“阀门命令关闭”;和(2)“即使没有命令阀门也会关闭”。另一个例子是带有贡献者的OR门:(1)“软件逻辑满足生成阀门关闭命令”;和(2)“即使软件逻辑不满足,也会生成一个阀门关闭命令”。以这种方式准备的故障树本质上是完整的,并且更易于审查。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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