{"title":"Lee: In Search of the Decisive Battle at Gettysburg","authors":"Michael J. Forsyth","doi":"10.1353/GET.2015.0001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Search of the Decisive Battle at Gettysburg the military in order to achieve that end state or whether or not it is possible to meet the objectives. Th e operational level is the province of the senior military leaders. Th e generals receive the strategic goals from the political leaders and translate them into tangible military plans— a campaign— capable of achieving the end state. Before defi ning the tactical level, we must fi rst defi ne the term “campaign.” Gen. Robert E. Lee is clearly among the outstanding tacticians to emerge from Civil War historiography. His record of tactical success has few peers and includes such battles as Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. Each of these engagements demonstrates Lee’s fi rm grasp of defensive and off ensive warfare. Furthermore, both Second Manassas and Chancellorsville show Lee’s keen understanding and expert use of the Napoleonic turning movement as described by Antoine de Jomini in his treatise on the art of war.1 However, Lee’s unparalleled grasp of Napoleonic tactics may have been the albatross that prevented greater success at the operational and strategic levels of war. At Gettysburg, Lee attempted to achieve the ultimate Civil War victory in one great battle in Pennsylvania. While Lee had a fi rm grasp of strategy, operations, and tactics, he failed at the two higher levels at Gettysburg because he became so engrossed with the tactical details and the possibility of achieving an Austerlitz that he lost his focus on directing a campaign linked to political ends. Th is contributed to the Confederacy’s demise and provides a textbook example of a commander reverting to where one is comfortable— in Lee’s case, the tactical level of war. Current military doctrine defi nes three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Th e strategic level is the domain of politicians and the most senior military leaders. At this level the national political leaders defi ne the parameters of what the war must achieve— the end state— and what constitutes successful prosecution of the confl ict. Th eir military advisors provide advice on how best to use","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"284 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Gettysburg Magazine","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2015.0001","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In Search of the Decisive Battle at Gettysburg the military in order to achieve that end state or whether or not it is possible to meet the objectives. Th e operational level is the province of the senior military leaders. Th e generals receive the strategic goals from the political leaders and translate them into tangible military plans— a campaign— capable of achieving the end state. Before defi ning the tactical level, we must fi rst defi ne the term “campaign.” Gen. Robert E. Lee is clearly among the outstanding tacticians to emerge from Civil War historiography. His record of tactical success has few peers and includes such battles as Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. Each of these engagements demonstrates Lee’s fi rm grasp of defensive and off ensive warfare. Furthermore, both Second Manassas and Chancellorsville show Lee’s keen understanding and expert use of the Napoleonic turning movement as described by Antoine de Jomini in his treatise on the art of war.1 However, Lee’s unparalleled grasp of Napoleonic tactics may have been the albatross that prevented greater success at the operational and strategic levels of war. At Gettysburg, Lee attempted to achieve the ultimate Civil War victory in one great battle in Pennsylvania. While Lee had a fi rm grasp of strategy, operations, and tactics, he failed at the two higher levels at Gettysburg because he became so engrossed with the tactical details and the possibility of achieving an Austerlitz that he lost his focus on directing a campaign linked to political ends. Th is contributed to the Confederacy’s demise and provides a textbook example of a commander reverting to where one is comfortable— in Lee’s case, the tactical level of war. Current military doctrine defi nes three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Th e strategic level is the domain of politicians and the most senior military leaders. At this level the national political leaders defi ne the parameters of what the war must achieve— the end state— and what constitutes successful prosecution of the confl ict. Th eir military advisors provide advice on how best to use