The War Ledger

A. Organski, J. Kugler
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引用次数: 329

Abstract

"The War Ledger" provides fresh, sophisticated answers to fundamental questions about major modern wars: Why do major wars begin? What accounts for victory or defeat in war? How do victory and defeat influence the recovery of the combatants? Are the rules governing conflict behavior between nations the same since the advent of the nuclear era? The authors find such well-known theories as the balance of power and collective security systems inadequate to explain how conflict erupts in the international system. Their rigorous empirical analysis proves that the power-transition theory, hinging on economic, social, and political growth, is more accurate; it is the differential rate of growth of the two most powerful nations in the system-the dominant nation and the challenger-that destabilizes all members and precipitates world wars. Predictions of who will win or lose a war, the authors find, depend not only on the power potential of a nation but on the capability of its political systems to mobilize its resources-the "political capacity indicator." After examining the aftermath of major conflicts, the authors identify national growth as the determining factor in a nation's recovery. With victory, national capabilities may increase or decrease; with defeat, losses can be enormous. Unexpectedly, however, in less than two decades, losers make up for their losses and "all" combatants find themselves where they would have been had no war occurred. Finally, the authors address the question of nuclear arsenals. They find that these arsenals do not make the difference that is usually assumed. Nuclear weapons have not changed the structure of power on which international politics rests. Nor does the behavior of participants in nuclear confrontation meet the expectations set out in deterrence theory.
战争账簿
《战争总账》为有关现代主要战争的基本问题提供了新鲜而复杂的答案:为什么主要战争开始?是什么导致了战争中的胜利或失败?胜利和失败如何影响战斗人员的恢复?自核时代到来以来,管理国家间冲突行为的规则还一样吗?作者发现,诸如权力平衡和集体安全体系等众所周知的理论不足以解释国际体系中的冲突是如何爆发的。他们严谨的实证分析证明,以经济、社会和政治增长为前提的权力转移理论更为准确;正是体系中两个最强大的国家——主导国和挑战者——的不同增长率破坏了所有成员国的稳定,引发了世界大战。作者发现,预测谁将赢得或输掉一场战争,不仅取决于一个国家的力量潜力,还取决于其政治制度动员其资源的能力——即“政治能力指标”。在研究了重大冲突的后果之后,作者认为国家增长是一个国家复苏的决定性因素。随着胜利,国家能力可能增强或减弱;一旦失败,损失可能是巨大的。然而,出乎意料的是,在不到二十年的时间里,失败者弥补了他们的损失,而“所有”战斗人员发现自己处于没有战争发生时所处的位置。最后,作者讨论了核武库问题。他们发现,这些武器库并没有像人们通常认为的那样发挥作用。核武器并没有改变国际政治所依赖的权力结构。核对抗参与者的行为也不符合威慑理论所设定的期望。
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