Director liability and reckless trading: The criminal law as a tool of corporate governance

John T. Quinn
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Abstract

Changes in corporate governance have often been in response to high profile failures. The European banking crisis again highlighted the potential for risks taken by company directors to cause harm. This crisis has resulted in a renewed focus on the decision making of directors and their potential criminal liability. Criminalising the actions of company directors is not new, numerous crimes exist for actions taken within companies such as fraud or interfering with the integrity of the market. However, what has traditionally not been criminalised in common law jurisdictions is business decisions which lack the elements necessary for fraud but that meet the criminal standard of recklessness – the conscious taking of substantial and unjustifiable risks. The problem with criminalising reckless risk taking in companies is that much of corporate law is designed to encourage risk taking. Separate legal personality and limited liability ensure that the personal assets of directors and members are protected from the claims of company creditors. This separation serves, among other things, to encourage the investment and the entrepreneurial risk taking necessary for companies, and ultimately a market economy, to be successful. If the criminal law inhibits such risk taking it could undermine corporate law and stifle corporate activity. This paper will explore the legal tensions between encouraging entrepreneurial risk taking and deterring reckless risk taking in companies. It will do this by analysing recent legal reforms and proposed legal reforms in England and Ireland.
董事责任与鲁莽交易:作为公司治理工具的刑法
公司治理的变化往往是对高调失败的回应。欧洲银行业危机再次凸显了公司董事承担风险造成伤害的可能性。这场危机导致人们重新关注董事的决策及其潜在的刑事责任。将公司董事的行为定为刑事犯罪并不新鲜,在公司内部采取的行为,如欺诈或干扰市场诚信,存在许多犯罪行为。然而,在普通法司法管辖区,传统上不被定为刑事犯罪的是那些缺乏欺诈必要要素,但符合鲁莽的刑事标准的商业决策——有意识地承担重大和不合理的风险。将公司的鲁莽冒险行为定为刑事犯罪的问题在于,大部分公司法的设计就是为了鼓励冒险。独立的法人资格和有限责任确保董事和成员的个人资产免受公司债权人的索赔。除其他外,这种分离有助于鼓励投资和企业家承担风险,这是公司取得成功所必需的,最终也是市场经济取得成功所必需的。如果刑法禁止这种冒险行为,它可能会破坏公司法并扼杀公司活动。本文将探讨鼓励企业冒险和阻止公司鲁莽冒险之间的法律紧张关系。它将通过分析英格兰和爱尔兰最近的法律改革和拟议的法律改革来做到这一点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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