TEEv: virtualizing trusted execution environments on mobile platforms

Wenhao Li, Yubin Xia, Long Lu, Haibo Chen, B. Zang
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引用次数: 29

Abstract

Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) are widely deployed, especially on smartphones. A recent trend in TEE development is the transition from vendor-controlled, single-purpose TEEs to open TEEs that host Trusted Applications (TAs) from multiple sources with independent tasks. This transition is expected to create a TA ecosystem needed for providing stronger and customized security to apps and OS running in the Rich Execution Environment (REE). However, the transition also poses two security challenges: enlarged attack surface resulted from the increased complexity of TAs and TEEs; the lack of trust (or isolation) among TAs and the TEE. In this paper, we first present a comprehensive analysis on the recent CVEs related to TEE and the need of multiple TEE scheme. We then propose TEEv, a TEE virtualization architecture that supports multiple isolated, restricted TEE instances (i.e., vTEEs) running concurrently. Relying on a tiny hypervisor (we call it TEE-visor), TEEv allows TEE instances from different vendors to run in isolation on the same smartphone and to host their own TAs. Therefore, a compromised vTEE cannot affect its peers or REE; TAs no longer have to run in untrusted/unsuitable TEEs. We have implemented TEEv on a development board and a real smartphone, which runs multiple commercial TEE instances from different vendors with very small porting effort. Our evaluation results show that TEEv can isolate vTEEs and defend all known attacks on TEE with only mild performance overhead.
TEEv:在移动平台上虚拟化可信执行环境
可信执行环境(TEE)被广泛部署,尤其是在智能手机上。TEE开发的一个最新趋势是从供应商控制的单一用途TEE向开放TEE的转变,开放TEE承载来自多个源的具有独立任务的可信应用程序(ta)。这种转变有望创建一个TA生态系统,为运行在富执行环境(REE)中的应用程序和操作系统提供更强大的定制安全性。然而,这种转变也带来了两个安全挑战:由于ta和tee的复杂性增加而导致攻击面扩大;助教和TEE之间缺乏信任(或孤立)。本文首先对近年来与TEE相关的cve和多TEE方案的需求进行了综合分析。然后我们提出TEEv,这是一种TEE虚拟化架构,支持并发运行的多个隔离的、受限制的TEE实例(即vtee)。依靠一个小型管理程序(我们称之为TEE-visor), TEEv允许来自不同供应商的TEE实例在同一智能手机上隔离运行,并托管它们自己的ta。因此,受损的vTEE不会影响其对等体或REE;TAs不再需要在不受信任/不合适的tee中运行。我们已经在开发板和真正的智能手机上实现了TEEv,它运行来自不同供应商的多个商业TEE实例,移植工作非常少。我们的评估结果表明,TEEv可以隔离vtee并防御所有已知的针对TEE的攻击,而性能开销很小。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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