{"title":"Four Pillars of Job Applicant Screening in China","authors":"V. Hlasny","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2499041","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Chinese employers practice extensive personal screening of job applicants. This study identifies four manifestations of this practice by motive – statistical, customer and employer taste-based, and regulatory – and evaluates their prevalence, economic determinants and implications for firms’ performance using simultaneous-equations models. Ordinary linear and Poisson regression specifications are estimated. Statistical screening is related positively to employers’ capital intensity, labor-market power and private ownership, and negatively to the supply of skills in provincial labor markets, as may be expected. Customer-taste screening is more prevalent in service and sales industries, as expected, and interestingly in wealthy first-tier cities. Employer-taste screening appears more prevalent at privately-owned firms, and surprisingly in skill-intensive industries and in first-tier cities, potentially reflecting difficulty at distinguishing it from customer-taste screening. Regulatory screening is related positively to firms’ market power, capital intensity and state ownership, as expected. Statistical and customer-taste screening is associated with higher firm profitability, particularly in skill-intensive industries and in service and sales industries, respectively, while employer-taste and regulatory screening is associated with lower profitability, as expected. These results jointly validate our identification of the four pillars of applicant screening.","PeriodicalId":260378,"journal":{"name":"Human Resource Management & Organizational Behavior eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Human Resource Management & Organizational Behavior eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2499041","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
Chinese employers practice extensive personal screening of job applicants. This study identifies four manifestations of this practice by motive – statistical, customer and employer taste-based, and regulatory – and evaluates their prevalence, economic determinants and implications for firms’ performance using simultaneous-equations models. Ordinary linear and Poisson regression specifications are estimated. Statistical screening is related positively to employers’ capital intensity, labor-market power and private ownership, and negatively to the supply of skills in provincial labor markets, as may be expected. Customer-taste screening is more prevalent in service and sales industries, as expected, and interestingly in wealthy first-tier cities. Employer-taste screening appears more prevalent at privately-owned firms, and surprisingly in skill-intensive industries and in first-tier cities, potentially reflecting difficulty at distinguishing it from customer-taste screening. Regulatory screening is related positively to firms’ market power, capital intensity and state ownership, as expected. Statistical and customer-taste screening is associated with higher firm profitability, particularly in skill-intensive industries and in service and sales industries, respectively, while employer-taste and regulatory screening is associated with lower profitability, as expected. These results jointly validate our identification of the four pillars of applicant screening.