Keep me Updated: An Empirical Study of Third-Party Library Updatability on Android

Erik Derr, Sven Bugiel, S. Fahl, Yasemin Acar, Michael Backes
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引用次数: 141

Abstract

Third-party libraries in Android apps have repeatedly been shown to be hazards to the users' privacy and an amplification of their host apps' attack surface. A particularly aggravating factor to this situation is that the libraries' version included in apps are very often outdated. This paper makes the first contribution towards solving the problem of library outdatedness on Android. First, we conduct a survey with 203 app developers from Google Play to retrieve first-hand information about their usage of libraries and requirements for more effective library updates. With a subsequent study of library providers' semantic versioning practices, we uncover that those providers are likely a contributing factor to the app developers' abstinence from library updates in order to avoid ostensible re-integration efforts and version incompatibilities. Further, we conduct a large-scale library updatability analysis of 1,264,118 apps to show that, based on the library API usage, 85.6% of the libraries could be upgraded by at least one version without modifying the app code, 48.2% even to the latest version. Particularly alarming are our findings that 97.8% out of 16,837 actively used library versions with a known security vulnerability could be easily fixed through a drop-in replacement of the vulnerable library with the fixed version. Based on these results, we conclude with a thorough discussion of solutions and actionable items for different actors in the app ecosystem to effectively remedy this situation.
Keep me update: Android平台上第三方图书馆更新能力的实证研究
Android应用程序中的第三方库一再被证明对用户隐私构成威胁,并扩大了其宿主应用程序的攻击面。造成这种情况的一个特别严重的因素是,应用程序中包含的库版本经常是过时的。本文为解决Android上的库过时问题做出了第一个贡献。首先,我们对来自Google Play的203个应用程序开发者进行了调查,以获取他们使用库的第一手信息,以及对更有效的库更新的需求。通过对库提供商的语义版本控制实践的后续研究,我们发现这些提供商可能是应用程序开发人员为了避免表面上的重新集成工作和版本不兼容而拒绝库更新的一个促成因素。此外,我们对1,264,118个应用程序进行了大规模的库更新能力分析,结果表明,基于库API的使用情况,85.6%的库可以在不修改应用程序代码的情况下升级到至少一个版本,48.2%的库甚至可以升级到最新版本。特别令人担忧的是,我们的发现是,在16837个活跃使用的具有已知安全漏洞的库版本中,97.8%可以通过使用固定版本替换易受攻击的库来轻松修复。基于这些结果,我们对应用生态系统中不同参与者的解决方案和可操作项目进行了深入的讨论,以有效地纠正这种情况。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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