Preventing Cooperative Black Hole Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Simulation Implementation and Evaluation

H. Weerasinghe, Huirong Fu
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引用次数: 216

Abstract

A black hole attack is a severe attack that can be easily employed against routing in mobile ad hoc networks. A black hole is a malicious node that falsely replies for any route requests without having active route to specified destination and drops all the receiving packets. If these malicious nodes work together as a group then the damage will be very serious. This type of attack is called cooperative black hole attack. In S. Ramaswamy et al. (2003), we proposed a solution to identifying and preventing the cooperative black hole attack. Our solution discovers the secure route between source and destination by identifying and isolating cooperative black hole nodes. In this paper, via simulation, we evaluate the proposed solution and compare it with other existing solutions in terms of throughput, packet loss percentage, average end-to-end delay and route request overhead. The experiments show that (1) the AODV greatly suffers from cooperative black holes in terms of throughput and packet losses, and (2) our solution proposed in S. Ramaswamy et al. (2003) presents good performance in terms of better throughput rate and minimum packet loss percentage over other solutions, and (3) our solution can accurately prevent the cooperative black hole attacks. The example findings are: (1) the proposed scheme presents 5 - 8% more communication overhead of route request; and (2) The secure route discovery delay slightly increases the packet loss percentage.
防止移动Ad Hoc网络中的协同黑洞攻击:仿真实现与评估
黑洞攻击是一种很容易被用来攻击移动自组织网络中的路由的严重攻击。黑洞是一种恶意节点,它在没有指定目的地的活动路由的情况下,错误地响应任何路由请求,并丢弃所有接收到的数据包。如果这些恶意节点组成一个小组一起工作,那么破坏将是非常严重的。这种类型的攻击被称为合作黑洞攻击。S. Ramaswamy et al.(2003)提出了一种识别和防止协同黑洞攻击的解决方案。该方案通过识别和隔离合作黑洞节点,发现源和目的之间的安全路由。在本文中,通过仿真,我们评估了所提出的解决方案,并将其与其他现有解决方案在吞吐量,丢包率,平均端到端延迟和路由请求开销方面进行了比较。实验表明:(1)AODV在吞吐量和丢包方面受到合作黑洞的严重影响;(2)S. Ramaswamy et al.(2003)提出的解决方案在吞吐量和丢包率方面比其他解决方案表现出较好的性能;(3)我们的解决方案可以准确地防止合作黑洞攻击。实例结果表明:(1)该方案路由请求的通信开销增加5 ~ 8%;(2)安全路由发现延迟会略微增加丢包率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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