Don't Touch that Column: Portable, Fine-Grained Access Control for Android's Native Content Providers

Aisha I. Ali-Gombe, G. Richard, Irfan Ahmed, Vassil Roussev
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Android applications access native SQLite databases through their Universal Resource Identifiers (URIs), exposed by the Content provider library. By design, the SQLite engine used in the Android system does not enforce access restrictions on database content nor does it log database accesses. Instead, Android enforces read and write permissions on the native providers through which databases are accessed via the mandatory applications permissions system. This system is very coarse grained, however, and can allow applications far greater access to sensitive data than a user might intend. In this paper, we present a novel technique called priVy that merges static bytecode weaving and database query rewriting to achieve low-level access control for Android native providers at the application level. priVy defines access control for both database schema and entities and does not require any modifications to the underlying operating system and/or framework code. Instead, it provides a new Controller stub which is statically woven into the target application and a Controller interface for setting access levels, thus making it accessible and easily adoptable by average users. We provide an evaluation in terms of the resilience of applications to instrumentation as well as static and runtime instrumentation overhead. In our testing, priVy incurs an average of 1032 additional method calls or joinpoints created and it takes an average of 15 seconds to recompile an app and imposes virtually no runtime overhead.
不要碰那个专栏:Android原生内容提供商的可移植、细粒度访问控制
Android应用程序通过它们的通用资源标识符(Universal Resource Identifiers, uri)访问原生SQLite数据库,uri由Content provider库公开。通过设计,Android系统中使用的SQLite引擎不会对数据库内容强制执行访问限制,也不会记录数据库访问。相反,Android通过强制应用程序权限系统对本地提供程序执行读写权限,通过这些提供程序访问数据库。然而,这个系统是非常粗粒度的,允许应用程序访问敏感数据的权限远远超过用户的预期。在本文中,我们提出了一种名为priVy的新技术,它将静态字节码编织和数据库查询重写合并在一起,从而在应用程序级别实现Android原生提供商的低级访问控制。priVy定义了数据库模式和实体的访问控制,不需要对底层操作系统和/或框架代码进行任何修改。相反,它提供了一个新的Controller存根(静态地编织到目标应用程序中)和一个用于设置访问级别的Controller接口,从而使普通用户可以访问并轻松采用它。我们根据应用程序对检测的弹性以及静态和运行时检测开销提供了评估。在我们的测试中,priVy平均会产生1032个额外的方法调用或创建连接点,重新编译应用程序平均需要15秒,并且几乎不会增加运行时开销。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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