Epistemic Problems of Moral Testimony

E. Wiland
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Abstract

This chapter discusses various arguments emphasizing epistemic problems with accepting moral testimony. It is often thought that there are various barriers that prevent a hearer from acquiring knowledge of moral truths on another person’s testimony. This chapter argues that none of these barriers are insurmountable. Although there indeed are various pitfalls to accepting testimony, none are peculiar to accepting moral testimony. In particular, it is possible to identify people who already have moral knowledge even if you yourself lack this knowledge. To do this, you need a theory of error—that is, some grasp of why another person might be better positioned to know moral truths than you yourself are. Armed with such a theory, it becomes possible to acquire moral knowledge through testimony.
道德证言的认知问题
本章讨论了强调接受道德见证的认识论问题的各种论点。人们通常认为,有各种各样的障碍阻止听者从另一个人的证词中获得道德真理的知识。本章认为这些障碍都不是不可克服的。虽然接受证词确实有各种各样的陷阱,但没有一个是接受道德证词所特有的。特别是,即使你自己缺乏道德知识,也可以识别出已经具备道德知识的人。要做到这一点,你需要一个错误理论——也就是说,你要理解为什么其他人可能比你自己更了解道德真理。有了这样的理论,就有可能通过证词获得道德知识。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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