Towards Identifying Human Actions, Intent, and Severity of APT Attacks Applying Deception Techniques - An Experiment

Joel Chacon, Sean McKeown, Richard Macfarlane
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Attacks by Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have been shown to be difficult to detect using traditional signature- and anomaly-based intrusion detection approaches. Deception techniques such as decoy objects, often called honey items, may be deployed for intrusion detection and attack analysis, providing an alternative to detect APT behaviours. This work explores the use of honey items to classify intrusion interactions, differentiating automated attacks from those which need some human reasoning and interaction towards APT detection. Multiple decoy items are deployed on honeypots in a virtual honey network, some as breadcrumbs to detect indications of a structured manual attack. Monitoring functionality was created around Elastic Stack with a Kibana dashboard created to display interactions with various honey items. APT type manual intrusions are simulated by an experienced pentesting practitioner carrying out simulated attacks. Interactions with honey items are evaluated in order to determine their suitability for discriminating between automated tools and direct human intervention. The results show that it is possible to differentiate automatic attacks from manual structured attacks; from the nature of the interactions with the honey items. The use of honey items found in the honeypot, such as in later parts of a structured attack, have been shown to be successful in classification of manual attacks, as well as towards providing an indication of severity of the attacks
应用欺骗技术识别APT攻击的人类行为、意图和严重程度-一项实验
使用传统的基于签名和异常的入侵检测方法很难检测到高级持续威胁(apt)的攻击。欺骗技术,如诱饵对象,通常称为蜂蜜物品,可用于入侵检测和攻击分析,提供检测APT行为的替代方案。这项工作探索了使用蜂蜜项对入侵交互进行分类,将自动攻击与需要一些人工推理和交互才能进行APT检测的攻击区分开来。在虚拟蜂蜜网络的蜜罐上部署了多个诱饵项目,其中一些作为面包屑来检测结构化人工攻击的迹象。在Elastic Stack周围创建了监控功能,并创建了Kibana仪表板来显示与各种蜂蜜物品的交互。APT类型的手动入侵由经验丰富的渗透测试从业者执行模拟攻击来模拟。评估与蜂蜜物品的相互作用,以确定它们在自动工具和直接人为干预之间的适用性。结果表明,该方法可以区分自动攻击和人工结构化攻击;从与蜂蜜相互作用的性质来看。使用在蜜罐中发现的蜂蜜物品,例如在结构化攻击的后面部分,已被证明在手动攻击分类方面是成功的,并且可以提供攻击严重程度的指示
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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