Decentralization, Corruption, and the Unofficial Economy

M. Alexeev, Ľuba Habodászová
{"title":"Decentralization, Corruption, and the Unofficial Economy","authors":"M. Alexeev, Ľuba Habodászová","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.990061","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the implications of decentralization for the incentives of local governments to provide productivity enhancing local public goods and extort bribes from local entrepreneurs. We show that an increase in the share of locally raised tax revenue left with the local government raises its incentives to provide public goods and brings more entrepreneurs into the official economy. Corruption, measured by the size of bribes that local officials charge entrepreneurs for issuing licenses for operating officially, may increase or decrease, depending on the extent to which public goods enhance the entrepreneur’s productivity. The tests using cross-sectional country-level data support the model’s implications.","PeriodicalId":324775,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Political Systems (Sub-Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERPN: Political Systems (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.990061","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7

Abstract

We analyze the implications of decentralization for the incentives of local governments to provide productivity enhancing local public goods and extort bribes from local entrepreneurs. We show that an increase in the share of locally raised tax revenue left with the local government raises its incentives to provide public goods and brings more entrepreneurs into the official economy. Corruption, measured by the size of bribes that local officials charge entrepreneurs for issuing licenses for operating officially, may increase or decrease, depending on the extent to which public goods enhance the entrepreneur’s productivity. The tests using cross-sectional country-level data support the model’s implications.
权力下放、腐败和非官方经济
我们分析了权力下放对激励地方政府提供提高生产率的地方公共产品和向当地企业家勒索贿赂的影响。我们表明,地方税收收入中留给地方政府的份额增加,提高了地方政府提供公共产品的动力,并使更多的企业家进入官方经济。以地方官员向发放正式经营许可证的企业家收取的贿赂规模来衡量的腐败,可能会增加或减少,这取决于公共产品提高企业家生产力的程度。使用国家级横断面数据的测试支持了该模型的含义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信
小红书