{"title":"Varieties of Response-Dependence: A Critique of Zangwill","authors":"E. A. Compton","doi":"10.4299/ASAGE.V1I1.8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The dispositional nature of aesthetic properties is taken by some to be a problem for aesthetic property realism. Nick Zangwill argues that because aesthetic properties supervene on sensory properties such as color, they must be secondary qualities, and his response-dependence account of secondary qualities leads him to aesthetic nonrealism about sensory properties and then aesthetic properties. I find that Zangwill's treatment of sensory property dispositions falls prey to a confusion of the dispositions and their manifestations, and his argument moves too quickly from conceptual to ontological response-dependence. The possibility of a realist dispositional account of sensory and aesthetic properties remains open.","PeriodicalId":133231,"journal":{"name":"American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-Journal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4299/ASAGE.V1I1.8","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
The dispositional nature of aesthetic properties is taken by some to be a problem for aesthetic property realism. Nick Zangwill argues that because aesthetic properties supervene on sensory properties such as color, they must be secondary qualities, and his response-dependence account of secondary qualities leads him to aesthetic nonrealism about sensory properties and then aesthetic properties. I find that Zangwill's treatment of sensory property dispositions falls prey to a confusion of the dispositions and their manifestations, and his argument moves too quickly from conceptual to ontological response-dependence. The possibility of a realist dispositional account of sensory and aesthetic properties remains open.