Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs

Paul Dütting, M. Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier
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引用次数: 142

Abstract

We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by constructing price-based online approximation algorithms, a natural extension of threshold algorithms for settings beyond binary selection. Our analysis takes the form of an extension theorem: we derive sufficient conditions on prices when all weights are known in advance, then prove that the resulting approximation guarantees extend directly to stochastic settings. Our framework unifies and simplifies much of the existing literature on prophet inequalities and posted price mechanisms, and is used to derive new and improved results for combinatorial markets (with and without complements), multi-dimensional matroids, and sparse packing problems. Finally, we highlight a surprising connection between the smoothness framework for bounding the price of anarchy of mechanisms and our framework, and show that many smooth mechanisms can be recast as posted price mechanisms with comparable performance guarantees.
预言家不等式变得简单:定价非随机输入的随机优化
我们提出了具有组合可行性约束的随机在线最大化问题的一般框架。该框架通过构建基于价格的在线近似算法(阈值算法的自然扩展,用于二元选择之外的设置)来建立先知不等式。我们的分析采用扩展定理的形式:我们推导出所有权重事先已知的价格的充分条件,然后证明所得到的近似保证直接扩展到随机设置。我们的框架统一并简化了许多关于预言不等式和发布价格机制的现有文献,并用于推导组合市场(有或没有互补)、多维拟阵和稀疏包装问题的新的和改进的结果。最后,我们强调了用于限制机制无政府状态价格的平滑框架与我们的框架之间的惊人联系,并表明许多平滑机制可以被重铸为具有可比性能保证的公布价格机制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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