Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic

P. Boghossian
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引用次数: 23

Abstract

This essay criticizes Williamson’s attempt, in his book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, to undermine the interest of the a priori–a posteriori distinction. Williamson’s argument turns on several large claims. The first is that experience often plays a role intermediate between evidential and merely enabling, and that this poses a difficulty for giving a theoretically satisfying account of the distinction. The second is that there are no constitutive understanding–assent links. Both of these claims are subjected to detailed scrutiny. In particular, it is argued that Williamson’s case of the deviant logician, Simon, fails to constitute an intelligible counterexample to the status of conjunction elimination as an understanding–assent link for ‘and’.
论先验和分析
本文批评威廉姆森在其著作《哲学的哲学》中试图破坏优先-事后区分的利益。威廉姆森的论点围绕着几个重大主张展开。首先,经验常常在证据和仅仅是使能之间起着中间的作用,这给从理论上令人满意地解释这一区别带来了困难。第二点是没有构成性的理解-同意联系。这两种说法都要经过详细的审查。特别是,有人认为Williamson的偏离逻辑学家Simon的案例未能构成一个可理解的反例,以证明连接消除作为“和”的理解-同意环节的地位。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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